Strategic Studies Quarterly

Abstract Introduction
Historically, intelligence has consistently been under political scrutiny, with intelligence elites often perceived as political servants. Intelligence, leveraging its ability to operate covertly, strives to supply the necessary data for policymakers to make informed decisions. Essentially, the primary objective of intelligence is to aid users in decision-making processes regarding potential actions. Against this background, it becomes crucial that intelligence remains unbiased and is not swayed by the political inclinations of a country’s political factions and parties, internal and external organizational interests, or the personal interests of politicians.
Intelligence operations should be conducted independently of political goals, and only the results derived should be presented to politicians. Fundamentally, intelligence agencies should prioritize national interests and remain detached from political, group, and personal interests. Thus, supporting policy-making differs from favoring a policy to the extent that objectivity is overlooked. The quintessence of the ideal relationship between intelligence and politics should be articulated as follows: Intelligence should serve the realm of politics, not its political overlords.
However, when the political environment influences intelligence to the point where intelligence outputs demonstrate a political leaning, we observe the phenomenon of intelligence politicization. Literature on intelligence indicates that politicization occurs when intelligence analysts, whether consciously or unconsciously, are swayed to generate outcomes that align with policymakers’ desires, rather than delivering the truth. This scenario represents a significant departure from the fundamental responsibility of intelligence, which is to tell the truth to those in authority.
 
Methodology
The politicization theory is formulated within the context of case studies. Essentially, it’s a research approach that involves the use of one or more case examples to construct theoretical frameworks, propositions, or mid-level theories, all of which are grounded in case-specific and empirical evidence. The key idea is that the employment of case examples forms the foundation for theory in an inductive way. In this approach, the theory evolves by identifying patterns of relationships both between and within the structures of case examples and their inherent logical arguments. This type of theory is rooted in the theorizing methodology of Paul R. Carlile and Clayton M. Christensen, following the pyramid of theorizing. Here, the politicization within intelligence agencies (both domestic and international) is examined through methods such as observation, interviews, and the study of secondary documents (library research). Following the theoretical framework of Carlile and Christensen, multiple cases were initially investigated. Subsequently, the observed elements were categorized. The relationships among the identified elements were then discerned. Ultimately, the primary propositions were established.
 
Result and Discussion
The theory of intelligence politicization encompasses two primary dimensions as detailed below:

Behavioral Dimension of Politicization

This refers to the elements that form the foundation of politicization within an intelligence organization. In the absence of these elements, politicization would not manifest. However, since some of them are inherent to the nature and essence of the intelligence organization, they internalize and institutionalize politicization. This dimension of politicization is deemed a necessary, but not sufficient precondition for the emergence of politicization in intelligence organizations. The behavioral dimension is subdivided into three categories: intelligence officer behavior, organizational behavior, and environmental behavior.
The behavior of the intelligence officer is influenced by a collection of factors that shape their individual actions. Organizational behavior is determined by factors that originate from the organization and its structure. Environmental behavior encompasses all factors that exist outside the intelligence organization, essentially residing in its external environment.

The Process Dimension of Politicization

This dimension refers to the actions and processes that give rise to politicization. By actualizing politicization, they induce alterations in the structure of politicization. This represents one of the sufficient, but not necessary, preconditions for the occurrence of politicization within intelligence organizations.
The process dimension of politicization is divided into three categories: “high process factors”, “low process factors”, and “online process factors”. The first encompasses all elements that are influenced by the policymaker to instigate politicization within the intelligence organization. The second refers to those elements that are executed by intelligence officers (except senior intelligence directors) to induce politicization. Given that in governmental bureaucracies, the appointment of directors is a critical phase in policy making and its execution, the emergence of politicization by intelligence directors is categorized separately under the third label of “online process factors”.

Abstract Politicized intelligence refers to intelligence products and analyzes that, instead of being realistic, are changed in order to support the options and results desired by policymakers or to please them. The politicization of intelligence represents the efforts of policymakers to shape intelligence in line with their political priorities. The research questions are; What are the differences between the formation of "politicized intelligence" and "politicization of intelligence" and what are the consequences of the politicization of intelligence for intelligence and political institutions? In response, interpretative research (fishing tool) and descriptive survey (questionnaire tool) methods were used respectively. Thematic analysis and Bartlett's tests and confirmatory factor analysis were used to analyze the data. The findings of the research show that "politicized intelligence" and "politicization of intelligence" are essentially different from each other in terms of formation through twelve fields. The outcome of both the problems of "politicized intelligence" and "politicization of intelligence" is similar and in fact, the ultimate influence of intelligence on politics is the distance of the intelligence organization from its professional identity and behavior and the inefficiency of the political system.

Abstract Politicization in the general sense refers to the involvement and preference of political and group motives and interests in judgments and decisions. In the field of governance, politicization is the non-observance of neutrality in policy-making and decision-making and the interference of political views, tendencies and biases in professional affairs; which may occur at different levels and patterns. Although politicization is one of the most important harms and inefficiencies in all areas of governance, it has more destructive consequences in the field of national security governance. In such a case, agents, political actors, and strategic and intelligence analysts intervene in their political preferences at various stages, such as: subject selection, data collection, information processing and analysis, and report production. They abandon objectivism in favor of political interests. This study examines the prominent trends and events in the field of national security governance in Iran, examines the dimensions and effectiveness of this issue and its findings show that politicization in forms such as polarization, influence, parallelism and disclosure or leakage of information entails significant political and security costs. Accordingly, suggestions have been made for controlling politicization or managing its harmful consequences.

Abstract Putting managers with political affiliations in charge of state organizations have both pros and cons for policy makers. Appointment of administrative and executive managers in order to ensure political commitment to the defined strategies with the aim of increasing the efficiency of the executive system on the one hand and rapid emergence of politicization that leads to reduced efficiency of the executive system on the other hand have exposed serious contradictions in the country's administrative affairs. Using inductive reasoning and a data-based approach as well as interviews and secondary sources, this article attempts to investigate the link between the political commitment of the establishment's administrative staff and the efficiency of the political system as well as the negative implications of politicization for the efficiency of the executive system. The main question asked in this article is what the implications of politicization of the country's executive system are for its efficiency. However, we should first provide an answer to this question: How do political appointments affect the efficiency of the political system?