Strategic Studies Quarterly

Abstract Elite migration constitutes a structural challenge for developing nations, and Iran is no exception, entailing profound implications for economic performance, social cohesion, and national security. This study sets out to structurally analyze the determinants shaping elite migration and to outline prospective scenarios for its future trajectory. Employing Parag Khanna's connectography as its theoretical foundation, the research adopts a foresight-oriented methodology. The inquiry is driven by the following question: which structural variables most critically influence Iran's elite migration outlook, and how might the resulting scenarios be managed to reinforce national security? A mixed-methods approach was adopted, comprising three phases: an extensive literature review to extract relevant factors, a cross-impact analysis conducted via MICMAC software, and scenario construction based on the GBN (Global Business Network) framework. The structural diagnostics pinpoint "governance and institutional capacity" and "global flows" as the primary driving forces. The interplay of these two variables yields four distinct plausible scenarios for the future of elite migration: active talent circulation, connected brain drain, endogenous and sustainable development, and talent stagnation and isolation. The findings further contend that a viable strategy for navigating this issue hinges on deep-seated reforms in governance, fostering substantive linkages with global scientific and technological networks, and advancing toward a knowledge-driven economy. In doing so, the paper emphasizes the necessity of supplanting reductionist, single-factor perspectives with a systemic and networked framework for policymaking in this arena.

Abstract Introduction Tension and rivalry have been enduring features of relations between the Islamic Republic of Iran and Saudi Arabia. Despite numerous diplomatic initiatives aimed at reducing bilateral frictions, efforts to establish a stable and cooperative relationship have achieved only limited success. Consequently, various forms of political and strategic conflict have characterized relations between the two states over the past forty-five years. Against this backdrop, this article seeks to identify and analyze the underlying causes of this persistent tension through a comprehensive, multi-layered analytical framework. The study addresses the following research question: What factors contribute to the persistence and escalation of tensions between the Islamic Republic of Iran and Saudi Arabia, and how do these factors operate? To answer this question, the article employs the conceptual and methodological framework of Causal Layered Analysis (CLA), examining the roots of bilateral tensions across four interconnected levels: the litany level, the systemic level, the discourse and worldview level, and the metaphor and myth level. Given the exploratory nature of CLA, the study does not advance a formal hypothesis. The analysis covers the period from 1979 to 2024. Methodology This study examines the factors contributing to tensions in Iran–Saudi relations through the application of Causal Layered Analysis (CLA), a futures-oriented methodology developed by Sohail Inayatullah. CLA is designed to uncover the deeper causes and underlying structures of complex issues and is particularly useful for understanding multidimensional phenomena that cannot be adequately explained through surface-level analysis alone. Within this framework, the primary focus is on identifying and explaining the main drivers of existing tensions. Given the large number of variables that may shape future developments, the potential future consequences of these tensions fall beyond the scope of the study. The framework operates through four analytical layers. The first, the litany level, focuses on observable events, political actions, policy positions, and broader trends that shape tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia. The second level examines systemic causes, including political, economic, social, technological, environmental, and historical factors. In this study, particular attention is given to political and security dynamics at the domestic, regional, and international levels, as well as the broader historical and social conditions that influence bilateral relations. The third layer explores the discourses and worldviews that sustain and legitimize existing tensions. This includes an examination of dominant ideologies, competing narratives, and the interests and values of the principal actors involved. The fourth and deepest layer focuses on myths and metaphors, encompassing the collective stories, symbols, and often subconscious assumptions that shape political perceptions and behavior. At this level, the study investigates widely held myths and metaphors within both societies and assesses their role in shaping the worldviews that influence relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Findings and Discussion The findings suggest that tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia are sustained by multiple factors operating across different analytical layers. At the litany level, the rhetoric, policies, and actions of political leaders in both countries reflect and reinforce fluctuations in bilateral tensions over time. At the systemic level, differences in political and economic systems, geopolitical competition, and contrasting approaches to regional and international order emerge as major sources of conflict. Saudi Arabia’s conservative monarchical system and its strategic partnership with the United States stand in sharp contrast to the revolutionary identity of the Islamic Republic of Iran and its opposition to Western—particularly American—influence. These fundamental differences have produced divergent political orientations and patterns of international engagement, thereby contributing to persistent bilateral disagreements. In addition, limited economic interdependence, weak commercial ties, and the absence of significant economic complementarity have constrained opportunities for cooperation that might otherwise mitigate tensions. Regional competition for influence, leadership, and strategic prominence in the Middle East further intensifies and prolongs the rivalry between the two states. At the discourse and worldview level, identity-based and ideological differences constitute another important source of tension. Saudi Arabia’s Sunni-Wahhabi and Arab identity differs significantly from Iran’s Shi'a-Islamic and Persian identity, creating distinct political narratives and perceptions of regional order. Divergent worldviews and competing regional and international discourses have reinforced mutual suspicion and contributed to the escalation of tensions. Nevertheless, the declining influence of Wahhabism in Saudi Arabia, particularly in the context of the reforms introduced under Mohammed bin Salman, may reduce the salience of some identity-based and ideological sources of conflict. At the deepest level of analysis, myths and metaphors play a critical role in sustaining long-term patterns of distrust and hostility. Popular expressions such as “Ajam” (non-Arabs, Iranian), “Rafidi” (heretic), and “Bedouin Arab,” together with political metaphors such as the “Safavid Empire,” “American Islam,” and the “Wahhabi State,” reflect narratives associated with anti-Iranian and anti-Arab sentiment. These narratives function as powerful symbolic frameworks through which each side interprets the other, thereby reinforcing negative perceptions and perpetuating conflict. Although both countries have increasingly adopted pragmatic policies driven by economic and strategic considerations, such myths and metaphors remain deeply embedded within their historical memory and social consciousness. Consequently, reducing their influence is likely to require sustained and long-term efforts. Conclusion This study has examined the underlying causes of tensions between the Islamic Republic of Iran and Saudi Arabia through the framework of Causal Layered Analysis. The findings demonstrate that the persistence and escalation of tensions cannot be attributed to a single factor but instead result from the interaction of multiple causes operating at different analytical levels. At the litany level, leadership rhetoric and media strategies contribute to the reproduction of tensions. At the systemic level, differences in political and economic systems, coupled with regional and international competition, continue to fuel rivalry. At deeper levels, worldviews, identity-based factors, ideological discourses, myths, and metaphors play a significant role in sustaining mutual distrust and conflict. The study concludes that meaningful improvement in Iran–Saudi relations requires not only the management of immediate political disputes but also efforts to address deeper structural, ideological, and perceptual sources of tension. While changes in leadership perceptions and the mitigation of systemic conflicts may facilitate rapprochement, transforming deeply rooted narratives, myths, and collective perceptions is likely to be a far more gradual and long-term process.

Abstract Introduction
Political parties and electoral systems are among the core institutions that shape governance and political development. They play a central role in political socialization, elite organization, public participation, and the overall policy-making process. By creating policy discourses and linking political elites with the wider public, parties can foster policy learning, strengthen the rationality of governance, and contribute to the formation of coherent national visions. In contrast, electoral systems, as mechanisms for power circulation and legitimacy renewal, enable fair competition and the presentation of alternative governance ideas.
Despite the presence of formal party and electoral structures in Iran, weak institutionalization, populist tendencies, lack of organizational cohesion, absence of party culture, and unstable electoral laws have prevented political parties from becoming effective actors in policy-making and national planning. The study asks why Iranian political parties have failed to act as learning and mediating institutions that generate sustainable, vision-driven policies, and what structural obstacles have constrained their performance.
A historical overview of Iranian parties shows that since the early post-revolution years, their capacity for discourse formation and doctrine development has steadily declined. Short-term electoral rivalries and populist slogans have replaced long-term policy thinking. This shift has widened the gap between policy-making institutions and society, weakening representation, policy accumulation, and the creation of shared national visions. The paper therefore argues that reforming Iran’s party and electoral systems is a prerequisite for better governance and more effective national policy-making.
 
Methodology
This study adopts a qualitative, descriptive–analytical approach based on documentary and library research. It reviews theoretical sources, legal documents, and comparative experiences to assess the role of political parties in designing and guiding policy processes. The research is exploratory rather than hypothesis-testing.
The theoretical framework rests on three interrelated components—political discourse formation, political marketing, and policy accumulation—which together form a “functional triangle of political parties.” This model explains how parties can promote national visions by creating and communicating policy discourses, marketing their programs within electoral systems, and ensuring continuity in pursuing long-term policies. The concept of policy entrepreneurship is also used to highlight the innovative role of parties in developing and implementing governance ideas.
Data were analyzed through two main steps: (1) tracing the historical and discursive evolution of parties in Iran from the 1970s onward, and (2) comparing party and electoral systems in countries that have successfully maintained coherent national visions. Using institutional and comparative analysis, the study identifies the main sources of dysfunction in Iran’s party system and proposes directions for reform.
 
Findings and Discussion
In developed political systems, parties act as key intermediaries and learning organizations that drive the formulation and implementation of stable policies. In Iran, however, weak institutional foundations and insufficient accumulative infrastructure have undermined such a role. Iranian parties face serious limitations in all three functional areas: discourse formation, political marketing, and policy accumulation.
In discourse formation, personality-based politics, lack of policy training, and weak connections between intellectual elites and party organizations have prevented the generation of lasting governance ideas. In political marketing, elections are dominated by broad, populist slogans rather than evidence-based programs. In policy accumulation, the absence of continuity and coherence in pursuing policies has blocked learning cycles and the systematic transfer of experience in national policy-making.
The country’s legal and institutional frameworks also fail to support party development. The lack of a comprehensive party law, weak financial oversight, poor linkages between parties and parliament, and overreliance on individual politicians have reduced parties to temporary electoral vehicles rather than stable policy institutions. Declining public trust and legitimacy have further weakened the organic connection between society and elites, eroding parties’ ability to inspire hope and articulate shared futures.
Comparative evidence from Germany, India, and China indicates that idea-driven, coherent, and consultative party systems—characterized by sustained interaction between parties and the state—are most capable of producing vision-driven policies. Fragmented systems lacking institutional accumulation, by contrast, struggle to build stable national visions. In Iran, the weakness of political parties not only hampers participatory policy-making but also diminishes the nation’s “political capital of hope.”
 
Conclusion
The analysis shows that Iranian political parties, constrained by structural weaknesses, inadequate legislation, personality-centered politics, and short-term electoral goals, have been unable to contribute effectively to policy-making or the shaping of national vision. As a result, the policy process has become fragmented, reactive, and largely detached from long-term learning and participation.
Revitalizing the role of parties requires action in three areas:
1.         Institutionalizing party culture through civic and political education;
2.         Reforming the electoral system to enhance transparency, competition, and accountability; and
3.         Strengthening the legal and institutional status of parties within the governance framework.
Parties must also reclaim their capacity to generate vision-driven policies grounded in national discourses and collective rationality. Continuous interaction among policy-makers, academics, and civil society can raise the quality of policy-making and rebuild political hope. Ultimately, without a restructured party and electoral system, effective governance, sustainable development, and a coherent national future will remain out of reach. Political parties can become genuine producers of national vision only when they move beyond short-term electoral competition and act as central actors in learning, decision-making, and the creation of development-oriented policy discourses.
 

Abstract Introduction
The issue of dual citizenship remains one of the main policy challenges in the Islamic Republic of Iran. This is largely due to the absence of a comprehensive and strategic approach, as well as differing governmental views on the subject. In contrast, many other countries have developed practical policies to manage the legal, political, and social dimensions of dual nationality.
This study examines the experiences of selected countries and evaluates their approaches to dual citizenship through the lens of national power. The central question is: “What lessons can Iran learn from other countries’ approaches to dual citizenship to improve its policymaking?”
The main hypothesis proposes that, while some countries still reject dual citizenship as a threat to their national power, many others have adopted a more pragmatic and positive view. These countries have reformed domestic laws and used international legal frameworks to minimize potential risks while turning dual citizens into a strategic asset for strengthening their national power.
 
Methodology
Where traditional perspectives tend to treat nationality and dual nationality in rigid legal or political terms, this study adopts a modern and qualitative approach. Using library-based research—including books, scholarly articles, and legal documents—it traces the evolution of attitudes toward nationality and dual nationality within the broader concept of national power, understood as the combination of a nation’s material and immaterial capabilities within its political and geographic boundaries.
 
Findings and Discussion
A review of global perspectives reveals a broad range of attitudes toward dual citizenship, from restrictive to permissive. Some countries, including China, Russia, and Japan, do not permit dual citizenship for their nationals, emphasizing the decisive role of population in national power. These countries often impose penalties, such as banning dual nationals from holding government positions.
In contrast, some countries argue that population size is no longer the primary determinant of power or security in the modern world. Consequently, they impose no restrictions on their citizens acquiring foreign citizenship. Indeed, global shifts in power structures, the expansion of digital communication that transcends borders, and the growing competition for human and financial capital have all prompted many states to reconsider their policies.
Today, many countries have adopted a more open approach to dual citizenship. On the one hand, they now recognize it for their citizens and have even amended domestic laws to facilitate this process. On the other hand, they have created internal legal frameworks and drawn upon international legal mechanisms to prevent potential political and legal complications arising from dual citizens. Recognizing the individual right to hold dual nationality, revising laws to ease travel and investment for dual citizens, and allocating parliamentary seats to citizens living abroad—many of whom hold dual nationality—are among the measures taken by countries with a balanced and pragmatic stance toward this phenomenon. At the same time, in terms of legal deterrence, these countries have sought to rely on internationally accepted doctrines and principles—such as the principle of state non-responsibility, the rule of primary nationality, and the theory of effective nationality—to manage potential political and legal challenges posed by dual citizens.
In Iran’s case, despite having between five and eight million citizens living abroad—many of whom are dual nationals—the country still lacks a unified policy on the issue. Although recent initiatives have taken a more moderate stance, inconsistencies remain. For instance, Iranian law prohibits dual nationals from public employment but allows them to serve as advisors, creating legal ambiguity and policy inefficiency.
Nevertheless, Iran’s recent approach signals a gradual shift toward engaging Iranians abroad as part of its broader strategy to enhance national power. Given that power today encompasses economic, cultural, and social dimensions—not only military and political ones—the Iranian diaspora can play a constructive role in countering anti-Iran sentiment and promoting international cooperation.
 
Conclusion
Dual citizenship has become a global phenomenon affecting nearly every country. States can broadly be divided into two categories: those that perceive it as a national threat (negative view) and those that see it as an opportunity (positive view). In Iran, although a negative attitude has long dominated, policymakers have increasingly recognized the need for reform. Recent years show a slow but clear movement toward acceptance and engagement with dual nationals as potential contributors to national development and diplomacy. Thus, while security concerns persist, the prevailing trend in Iran is shifting toward a more balanced and constructive view of dual citizenship as part of its national power.
Given these considerations, it is evident that formulating a coherent and strategic policy to address the issue of dual-national Iranians requires drawing upon the experiences of other countries. As the study findings indicate, although some nations—similar to the prevailing perspective in Iran—still view dual citizens as a potential threat to national cohesion and power, many others have recognized dual citizenship as a global reality. By moving beyond a purely negative or positive perception and adopting strategic policies aimed at maximizing engagement within a secure framework, these countries have managed to transform the challenges into a political, economic, and social opportunity both domestically and internationally.
In this regard, to address the question of dual-national Iranians while safeguarding national interests, Iran could initially follow the example of countries that regard dual citizenship as a personal matter, and subsequently establish mechanisms for mutual interaction between the government and dual citizens, paving the way for a comprehensive resolution of this issue.
 

Abstract Introduction
Today, social media platforms have become a primary source of news and information for many, rivaling traditional television and satellite channels. In this landscape, coordinated rumors, fake news, deepfakes, and AI-generated content have emerged as powerful tools for undermining the legitimacy of individuals, institutions, and entire political systems. These developments point toward a growing phenomenon known as “computational propaganda”.
Computational propaganda refers to the use of algorithms, automation, and human oversight to manage social media ecosystems or to deliberately spread misleading content across these platforms.
In this context, the rise of computational propaganda presents serious challenges to the soft power of the Islamic Republic of Iran. While some government-affiliated groups have used these tools to defend and promote their image, misuse of such tactics has undermined the credibility of the political system. Meanwhile, domestic and foreign actors alike have increasingly exploited these techniques to weaken Iran’s influence by targeting its internal digital vulnerabilities.
Given the complexity and evolving nature of computational propaganda, it is essential to reassess how Iran can effectively protect its soft power in a competitive and often hostile information environment.
 
Methodology
This study adopts a mixed-methods approach, combining thematic analysis (qualitative) and social network analysis (quantitative).
The research begins by analyzing tweets related to the "Operation True Promise 2", using social network analysis to identify posts influenced or supported by Israeli propaganda. A selection of these tweets is then subjected to thematic analysis to determine which propaganda strategies, as outlined in the theoretical framework, were most commonly used against Iran.
First, tweets containing the hashtags or keywords "Iran", "Israel", "True Promise", and "missile" were collected using data-mining tools. A retweet network graph for the relevant tweets was then created and analyzed using the Force Atlas 2 algorithm. The Gephi software was also used for visualizing and analyzing the graph.
For the thematic analysis, axial coding was applied, based on five key computational propaganda strategies. Each strategy was operationally defined in relation to the Iranian context:
1- Supportive Content: Posts showing support for Israel, advocating war against Iran, or promoting Reza Pahlavi as a viable opposition figure aligned with Israeli interests.
2- Attacks and Exposés: Criticism of the Iranian leadership, the "Operation True Promise 2," and Iran's regional policies, as well as mockery of Iran’s missile capabilities and accusations about intentionally keeping airspace open.
3- Distraction: Attempts to divert public attention away from the "Operation True Promise 2".
4- Polarization and Division: Content aimed at creating rifts between the government and the people of Iran.
5- Harassment and Suppression: Personal attacks or online harassment targeting supporters of Palestine or the "Operation True Promise 2", often through ridicule or mockery.
 
Discussion and Results
The data indicate a clear level of coordination among monarchist users and pro-Israel accounts. This is evidenced by analyzing retweet patterns. On average, there was 1 retweet per 11.55 likes across all users. However, among regular users—who tend to be apolitical—this ratio was 1 retweet per 51.31 likes, suggesting little to no coordination. In contrast, among monarchist users, the ratio was 1 retweet per 9.31 likes, implying higher levels of coordination and deliberate message amplification.
Among the tweets analyzed, humorous content received the most likes. This was followed by posts criticizing the Iranian political system, Supreme Leader, the "Operation True Promise 2", and Iran’s regional policies—especially those mocking the country's missile capabilities. Tweets in support of the government, the resistance axis, or opposing war received the next highest levels of engagement.
 
Conclusion
The findings clearly show that Israeli information operations have been actively used to damage Iran’s credibility and redirect public opinion toward alternative figures. Among the five identified strategies, “attacks and exposés” were the most prevalent. Simultaneously, efforts were made to frame Israel as a hero and Reza Pahlavi as a political alternative.
This study highlights how emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence and social media have opened new avenues for political systems to influence rivals and boost their own power. Computational propaganda, in particular, has become a powerful tool that can directly threaten the political integrity of other nations—and one that even weaker states can deploy against more powerful ones.
Addressing this challenge requires new strategies and a fundamentally different approach to governance, including changes in media, social, cultural, and political policies. Such strategies should aim to enhance the credibility of domestic media, build public trust in political leadership, and reduce societal and political tensions.

Abstract Introduction
Since the early 2010s, “Video On Demand” (VOD) has steadily captured an increasing share of Iranian media consumption and has begun to play a key role in the country’s overall media landscape. From its inception until now, there have been many disputes among various executive bodies about how VOD should be regulated, and no clear, optimal regulatory framework has been established. To envision an ideal scenario, it’s necessary to analyze the historical background first. This study seeks to establish a preliminary framework for regulation by identifying key historical events, segmenting the timeline using major milestones, and then pinpointing the emerging issues. The ultimate goal is to support and help policymakers in designing strategies that reflect the sector’s evolving complexities, based on documented evidence.
Methodology
This research employs documentary studies and interviews with experts and well-informed professionals. Data were analyzed using a descriptive and analytical approach. Themes were extracted from historical events and organized into analytical tables in chronological order. Expert feedback helped to identify key historical turning points, leading to the division of the timeline into distinct periods. For each period, a summary of the relevant themes was provided. Using these tables, the regulatory issues in the VOD sector were further categorized. Finally, to ensure the validity of the findings, the analytical tables were shared with experts, and additional input was incorporated based on their advice.
Discussion and Results
Based on the findings, the evolution of VOD regulation in Iran can be divided into five periods, each marked by historical milestones:

Period of Ambiguity and Instability (2011–2019)
Period of Stabilizing Iran's Audiovisual Media Regulation Authority (SARTA) (2019–2021)
Period of SARTA’s Decline (2021)
Period of Management and Approach Changes at SARTA (2022)
Period of Early Convergence (2023 and Beyond)





Period Title


Date


Measures Taken




Ambiguity and Instability


2011


The Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance appointed the Institute of Visual Media to regulate and propose legal frameworks for VOD




2014


IRIB was tasked with overseeing comprehensive audio-visual content (including VOD) per an order from the Supreme Leader




2015


A directive from the Supreme Leader to the then-President underscored IRIB’s exclusive mandate to regulate comprehensive audio-visual media in the digital space




2016


SATRA, under IRIB, was launched




Stabilizing SARTA


2019


Efforts focused on stabilizing the licensing process for audio-visual media platforms under SATRA, with intervention from the prosecutor’s office marking the end of fragmented regulation in the VOD sector




2020


Additional steps were taken to stabilize licensing for digital content by including a dedicated budget line for SATRA in the 2020 Budget Law and transferring production permits to IRIB.




SARTA’s Decline


2021


Responsibilities within IRIB became divided after the establishment of a Secretariat for the Production Permit Council within its Planning, Programming, and Budget Center (the “Almas” system). This coincided with efforts by the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance under the 13th government to reclaim regulatory authority, as evidenced by the removal of SATRA’s budget line in the 1401 Budget Law




Management and Approach Changes at SARTA


2022


A change in SATRA’s management brought about shifts in regulatory approaches and altered the organization’s interactions




Early Convergence


May 2023


A memorandum of understanding was signed between IRIB and the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance under the auspices of the Office of the Supreme Leader.




July 2023


The Supreme Council of the Cultural Revolution passed a resolution aimed at better organizing comprehensive audio-visual content




 
Based on the analysis of these developments, the study identified several key regulatory challenges in Iran’s VOD sector:

Lack of Political Consensus: There is significant internal and inter-agency disagreement—especially regarding private sector activities—with various bodies alternately viewing them as opportunities or threats.
Outdated Legal Framework: Unclear platform responsibilities—and, more broadly, an ambiguous legal framework governing their rights and obligations—along with vague regulatory competencies, the lack of clearly defined duties for some regulators, the way offenses and penalties are legally codified, insufficient guidelines for international interactions among platforms, weak rules on foreign investment, and inadequate child protection measures are all issues in urgent need of legal reform.
Impact of Political Change: Frequent shifts in government and political priorities have significantly influenced policymaking and regulation, undermining public trust.
Fragmentation of Regulatory Bodies: There is an excessive number of decision-making organizations compared to the real market players, leading to fragmented governance.
Unclear Institutional Relationships: The roles and boundaries between regulatory bodies and other institutions (legislative, executive, and judicial) are undefined, resulting in overlapping authorities and interference.
Conflicts of Interest: Competing interests at both intra- and inter-organizational levels have led to conflicts in regulatory practices.
Unresolved Theoretical Issues: Persistent questions remain on issues such as whether broadcast regulations should be the same as broadband ones, where the boundary lies between comprehensive and non-comprehensive content, and what the optimal regulatory model should be.
Incomplete Regulatory Approaches: Some regulators tend to adopt overly restrictive policies instead of more facilitative ones; in some cases, there is a narrow focus solely on content, neglecting industrial and economic aspects.

Conclusion
The study concludes that the main challenges in VOD regulation stem from a lack of policy consensus and the proliferation of governance bodies in the media sector. The key recommendation is to develop an integrated, overarching media policy that can achieve consensus among various agencies. Although the ideal long-term solution would involve establishing an independent, comprehensive media regulator that brings together all stakeholders, this is a gradual process requiring the gradual development of cognitive, legal, and discursive capacities in the country. As a more immediate measure, establishing a “regulator of regulators” or at least fostering effective, legally structured coordination and a clear division of responsibilities among existing regulators is recommended.

Abstract By the end of the twentieth century, it became evident that a highly centralized model of government was a source of crisis, and that centralization alone could not solve the problems at hand. Supporting local and regional governance through institutions such as local governments has come to be seen as a marker of both development and maturity in societies. Over time, evolving ideas about governance have led societies to pursue more democratic practices and to actively work toward speeding up the democratization process. Essentially, modern governance is about integrating the interests of the state and its people through collaboration and interaction. To facilitate this, governments need to establish mechanisms that create suitable, decentralized structures, enabling various bodies with broad authority and significant responsibility to play active roles in delivering public services. However, the assumption of certain responsibilities by local governments should not be interpreted as undermining or challenging the power of the central government—instead, the central government still holds its supervisory authority over local administration.
Throughout Iran’s history, governments have typically been characterized by individualized, absolutist, autocratic, and self-centered approaches. This led to the establishment of a highly centralized system. However, with the success of the Constitutional Revolution and the spread of ideas about the rule of people and citizens’ rights, Iran took its first steps toward breaking away from centralization. This revolution paved the way for the creation of democratic institutions such as the constitution, parliament, and various civic associations. Thereafter, public involvement in determining the country’s future and in forming local bodies—like provincial and municipal councils—became increasingly important, with certain local responsibilities being transferred to these new institutions. As a consequence, changes in leadership brought about shifts in the way national cohesion was understood within the context of local governance. Based on these developments, this paper aims to answer the question: “What impact have the different models of local governance throughout contemporary Iranian history had on national cohesion, considering its social, political, and cultural dimensions?”
Methodology
To address this question, the study first identifies various types of local governance. It then employs a mixed-methods approach that combines qualitative analysis of historical events and trends with quantitative survey research utilizing questionnaires. In this regard, 31 researchers and senior experts in contemporary Iranian history were purposefully selected and asked to complete a questionnaire designed to assess the relationship between local governance models and the elements of national cohesion.
Discussion and Results
The findings indicate that the impact of different local governance systems on national cohesion has varied significantly across four historical periods (according to the Iranian calendar, 1275–1400 [1896-2021]). Evidence, drawn from historical trends and expert opinions, suggests that the highest level of national cohesion was achieved during the fourth period—corresponding to the Islamic Republic—which received a score of 3.47 out of 5. The Constitutional period followed, while both the first and second Pahlavi periods reported lower cohesion scores.
Conclusion
In the final analysis, it is clear that local governance in Iran was traditionally characterized by appointed, undemocratic, and top-down practices until the Constitutional Revolution. Modern local governance began with that revolution and has evolved considerably over the past century. The study finds that before the Islamic Revolution, city councils served as the symbol of local governance in Iran, whereas afterward, Islamic city councils took on that role. An examination of the laws, institutions, associations, and urban local councils reveals that despite some common themes, there have been significant differences influenced by the pressures of the times, the power of the ruling government, and the ongoing struggle between centralization (dominated by the central government) and decentralization (promoted by local councils and associations). Ultimately, brief periods of decentralization have given way to a prevailing trend of centralization, primarily due to the absence of a deep democratic culture and the authoritarian nature of the central governments.

Abstract Introduction
The governance pattern of the Islamic Republic of Iran must align with its legitimizing discourse and demonstrate a coherence between this theory and practical governance. However, governance in Iran often wavers and oscillates between liberal and religious discourses. No political system can achieve long-term legitimacy through governance frameworks that are inconsistent with its core discourse. Therefore, this study aims to explore the concept of freedom within Iran's governance pattern. The Islamic Revolution in Iran achieved victory with the key slogan 'Independence, Freedom, Islamic Republic,' yet some supporters see freedom as a disruptive concept and are unwilling to embrace it. On the other hand, critics often accuse this pattern of being in conflict with the notion of freedom.
Here, we try to demonstrate the desirability of freedom within the governance pattern of the Islamic Republic of Iran and to answer the question, "What is the philosophy of freedom in this governance pattern, and why is it desirable?" The aim is to prevent theoretical mistakes in the discourse. Given the prevailing influence of liberalism and its discursive demands, in the absence of an alternative Islamic theory, it risks imposing itself on Iran's socio-political structure. Therefore, elucidating the philosophy of freedom within the governance pattern of the Islamic Republic helps prevent incorrect theoretical and practical choices in governance.

 
Methodology
In this study, a "descriptive-analytical" approach was used for data collection through the "documentary" method. The data analysis was performed using the qualitative method of "text-based hermeneutics."
 
Discussion and Results
This paper presents a coherent and interconnected discursive framework that reflects the philosophy of freedom and the intricate balance between the dos and dont's in this context. Firstly, it discusses Nizam-e-Takwin (The Order of Creation), demonstrating that from an ontological perspective, the belief in Ma'ad (Resurrection Day) and God's system of reward and punishment necessitate human freedom, as freedom is essential for "spiritual trial." Additionally, within the Islamic Revolution's discourse on anthropology, the belief in human "free will" and the "inherent nature of freedom" make freedom a valued concept. Thus, in religious rules, freedom is defined as liberation from servitude to anyone other than God and liberation from tyranny and oppression. In this regard, freedom is understood as a "right," "duty," and "value."
 
Conclusion
In the Islamic philosophy of freedom, "Tawhid" (monotheism) stands as the central principle and foundation. There is a seamless connection between Nizam-e-Takwin (The Order of Creation) and Nizam-e-Tashri (The Order of Religious Legislation), forming a unified system. This linkage in Shiism is established through the belief in the intrinsic goodness and badness of actions. Such a belief ensures that the moral quality of actions is rational and aligned with Nizam-e-Takwin, creating an integrated order where the dos and don'ts are interconnected.
In this framework, the philosophy of freedom within the governance pattern of the Islamic Republic of Iran is rooted in "Tawhid" (monotheism) principles. Freedom is regarded as a "right," "duty," and "value." This signifies that freedom is valuable because it is an inherent right. Furthermore, respecting and advocating freedom is a religious duty, which enhances its desirability. Additionally, freedom is recognized as a religious virtue. According to the Islamic worldview, humans possess free will and an innate inclination toward freedom. The system of rewards and punishments in Ma'ad (Resurrection Day) also necessitates human freedom, as the possibility of a spiritual trial depends on it, thus making the system logical.
Overall, this paper seeks to illustrate the philosophy of freedom within a cohesive and integrated system, emphasizing the link between Nizam-e-Takwin (The Order of Creation) and Nizam-e-Tashri (The Order of Religious Legislation) in the context of freedom. This represents a significant innovation in the study.

Abstract Introduction
Security theories have evolved significantly over time. Traditionally, pre-Cold War theories regarded security as a one-dimensional concept, primarily focused on military strength and defense. However, after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, these traditional views lost prominence due to their inability to address and resolve emerging security challenges. In response, more comprehensive approaches emerged, framing security as a multidimensional concept that encompasses economic, political, social, and environmental factors. Among these modern theories is the concept of “sustainable security.” This theory argues that the problems and issues of human societies have economic, political, and social roots.
In this context, drug trafficking has emerged as a significant issue within Iran's political economy, impacting both domestic and global security over recent decades. The province of Sistan and Baluchistan, which shares borders with Afghanistan and Pakistan, has become a critical entry point for drugs into Iran. Each year, large quantities of narcotics are smuggled across its borders.
This paper examines the political economy of narcotics, specifically the dynamics of drug trafficking. The central research question is “How does the political economy of narcotics in Sistan and Baluchestan province affect security and stability in Iran?” The innovative aspect of this study lies in its focus on a localized, provincial level of analysis. By applying a political economy framework to drug trafficking, the research aims to elucidate the phenomenon of narcotics trafficking and its security implications.
Methodology
This research employs a “conventional content analysis” methodology to examine news coverage of insecurity in Sistan and Baluchestan province over the past decade. Additionally, a “post-event analysis” was utilized to evaluate security trends in the province. Data sources include library materials and both official and unofficial reports from the Iranian police. To ensure reliability and validity, these reports were qualitatively validated through field interviews with experts and local residents.
Discussion and Results
According to a 2018 official report, 75% of the heroin and 75% of the morphine found in Iran originated from Pakistan, with the remaining portion entering directly from Afghanistan. In 2020 alone, police seized 311,136 kilograms of drugs and arrested 67,994 individuals on drug-related charges. These figures underscore the significant role that drug trafficking plays in the political economy of Sistan and Baluchestan province.
The production, distribution, and consumption of opiates have profoundly impacted the economic conditions and livelihoods of the people in this Iranian province. From this perspective, the political economy of narcotics emerges as a survival strategy for some citizens who lack adequate social security and welfare, forcing them to turn to the drug trade as a means of earning a living. Here, the term “political economy” refers to the dominant mode of production in a society, which encompasses both political and economic spheres, with a dynamic and reciprocal relationship between the two. This interplay directly and indirectly affects other societal domains, including security. The political economy of Sistan and Baluchestan province has a unique structure that significantly influences Iran's security. The province's production system includes both formal sectors, such as industry, agriculture, and services, and informal sectors, such as trafficking in humans, goods, fuel, weapons, and drugs.
Conclusion
This paper shows that the political economy of narcotics has significantly contributed to the escalation of violence in Sistan and Baluchestan province and its neighboring areas. This includes the proliferation of weapons, kidnappings, hostage-taking, addiction, and murder, culminating in organized violence. The findings indicate that, although an exact estimate of the narcotics economy’s scale remains elusive, it closely aligns with the official statistics for the province. The shortcomings of the official political economy have enabled the informal one - particularly the narcotics trade - to expand substantially, leading to severe negative security impacts.
 

Abstract Introduction
This study aims to answer the question "What are the key elements of administrative corruption in contemporary Iran?" Based on the results, the factors contributing to administrative corruption include the construction of political power; rentier government; state-controlled and non-competitive economy; political subject culture; weak civil organizations; lack of transparency, accountability, rule of law, and free media; political and administrative instability; weak judiciary and regulatory bodies; inefficient organizational structure; oversized government; the ethical standards of the governing elite; societal values; and the state of political parties and competitions. Despite the implementation of sound policies and measures in the Islamic Republic of Iran, the intended outcomes of an Islamic system in terms of preventing and addressing administrative corruption have not been realized. Furthermore, Iran’s position in the rankings of international organizations does not reflect the standards and expectations of the Islamic system and society.
 
Methodology
This paper employs both quantitative and qualitative approaches. Initially, studies on administrative corruption in contemporary Iran were reviewed, and the underlying causes and structural contexts were identified through qualitative content analysis. Subsequently, Open, axial, and selective (OAS) coding techniques were utilized, and their logical integration across three stages led to the determination of 20 final elements. Upon analyzing the data gathered during the open coding stage, a total of 354 concepts related to the causes and structural contexts of administrative corruption in Iran were ultimately derived.
Following this, during the axial coding stage, a logical sequence is established among the identified elements. To discern patterns in the data, a constant comparative analysis is performed again. This process involves comparing and integrating the coded data into suitable components. During the axial coding phase, 20 structural elements were identified. It’s worth noting that the roots of all these elements extend beyond the era of the Islamic Republic, tracing back to the times of the first and second Pahlavi governments, and even the Qajar era.
 
Result and Discussion
Given the fundamental distinction between the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran and its predecessors, and its focus on revolutionary ideals, particularly the pursuit of justice and the battle against corruption, it is crucial to address the structural shortcomings in these areas. Hence, the primary recommendations are as follows: lessening reliance on oil (a policy of the siege economy/resistance economy); instituting the rule of law; emphasizing transparency and enacting relevant laws; abolishing monopoly and fostering competition; diminishing the government’s role and size; bolstering the private sector; empowering regulatory bodies; ensuring political stability; enhancing democracy and civil organizations; supporting free and independent media; reforming the administrative structure; implementing e-government; advancing access to information; facilitating a platform for public oversight; increasing accountability; fostering religious culture and lifestyle; strengthening the government’s internal controls; and promoting education and awareness.

Abstract In national security governance, security policy-making is the duty of the
government. One of the tools of security management is governmental institutions.
According to the law, the country’s National Security Council is one of the
institutions in charge of national security policy management, which is responsible
for the internal security of the country through the security provision councils and
the relevant commissions in the provinces and cities. The purpose of this article is to
analyze, pathologize and evaluate the role of the National Security Council in the
governance structure of national security; for this purpose, the structural, functional
and legal areas of the Council and its relationship with other councils and
institutions responsible in the field of internal security have been measured. The
results of this article indicate that factors such as shortcomings in the law
determining the duties and organization of the country's security council,
composition of members and the type of their role in the council, reducing the
concept of internal security to military and law enforcement security and duty
overlapping with that of other institutions has caused this council not to be able to
play an effective role in the structure of the country's security governance as it
should; therefore, it has become more of a coordinating institution.

Abstract Transforming the organizing of the governmental institutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran into a parliamentary regime is a concern in which has been the focus of some writers and experts in recent years. In theoretical approaches, some see the Parliamentarization as a strategy to overcome the current problems, but some believe that the problems does not consider arising from the current regime's model in terms of the form of separation of powers and sometimes the problem has been known with the current Quasi-presidential regime and the necessity to move on to the requirements of real presidential regime. There are also two distinct views among the supporters of Parliamentarization: one that considers changing laws as an automatic setting of conditions for the efficient establishment of the parliamentary system and another view that believes it must be first prepared the conditions of the parliamentary system and then make change with less risk.
 
 

Abstract Managing and countering ethnic and religious extremist actions requires a thorough understanding of the components of the tendency of the element's members of these groups. At first glance, the idea is to deprive these elements of normal life and then join extremist ethnic and religious groups such as ISIS. The aim of this study is to answer the question: "What effect do the components of relative deprivation have on the tendency of some residents of the west of Iran to ISIS?". Considering the existing historical concepts and models to explain the factors of tendency to ethnic and religious extremist groups, new conceptual model has been designed using the theory of relative deprivation and has been studied by 80 security convicts with a history of membership in the ISIS group. The research data were analyzed using SPSS and SMART PLS software and regression and Friedman tests. In the end, the effectiveness of each variable was discussed in terms of existence and intensity.
 
 

Abstract New theories describe the Creative Class as the driving force behind creativity that consequently results in economic growth. This study aims to explore this concept in Iranian provinces based on the theoretical literature relating to the Creative Class and analyze the special patterns governing where they choose to live using spatial analysis methods. To this end, spatial autocorrelation indicators in a Geographic Information System (GIS Software) was used. The findings of the article suggest that there is an uneven distribution of the Creative Class in Iran. Tehran, due to its role as the country's capital and in light of the state's centralized political system as well as a quasi-capitalist and rentier economy, has become a place that attracts and accumulates members of the Iranian Creative Class.

Abstract In this article, the negative aspects of an oil-dependent economy and the opportunities that the tourism industry can open up for the Islamic Republic of Iran have been discussed, and the implications of this issue for the country's national security have been reviewed. This research assumes that profits from Iran's tourism industry can be a suitable alternative to oil revenues and help the country move toward sustainable development, which is one of the main requirements of sustainable national security.
 
 

Abstract It seems that the objective of the Trump administration's "maximum pressure" strategy toward Iran is Sovietization of the country or, in fact, the disintegration of the Islamic Republic of Iran through using the experiences of the Reagan administration in dealing with the Soviet Union. The findings of the present article show that the masterminds behind this project include Foundation for Defense of Democracies and certain right-wing and conservative think tanks in the United States such as the Heritage Foundation and American Enterprise Institute, which are the remnants of the administrations of George Bush senior or George W. Bush. The US State Department and the CIA are the executive arm of the project that involves US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, US special representative for Iran Brian Hook, and White House national security adviser John Bolton. According to this project, the collapse of the "Islamic Republic" or a change in the ruling political system is not enough and the main goal is the disintegration of the "Islamic Republic of Iran". However, the adoption of such a strategy does not necessarily mean that it will succeed and there, are factors that seriously impede the realization of this project.  
 
 

Abstract Iran and how to curb its regional influence has been one of the most important concerns of Saudi Arabia, especially over the past decade. The authors of this article maintain that the Saudis, through the adoption of a particular approach, has sought to expand their communication network in different areas in order to create integrated deterrence against Iran with the aim of compelling it to change its regional strategies. The main question asked in this article is how Saudi Arabia uses integrated deterrence to counter and contain Iran.
 
 

Abstract Given the fact that convergence and divergence in transatlantic relations and the role of Britain in the European Union have always been two important and determining factors in the EU's relationship with Iran, this article asks what implications Brexit and the presidency of Donald Trump in the United States could have for transatlantic relations and Iran. This paper assumes that Brexit and Trump's presidency—which have led to an unprecedented gap in transatlantic relations and security deficit in Europe—have promoted the EU to move toward reducing its strategic dependence and defend its own values and interests. Past experience has shown that such developments offer unique opportunities for the expansion of the Islamic Republic of Iran's relations with Europe, particularly considering the fact that Iran is one of the main bones of contention that have driven a wedge between governments on the two sides of the Atlantic Ocean.  
 
 

Abstract .

Abstract The discourse of the 11^th administration has taken shape based on the noble concept of "moderation" and its components include an interactive approach to the outside world, a moderate interaction model inside the country, an Iranian-Islamic model of development, a broad non-securitized model in the social field, non-mechanical cultural engineering, a combined-local-economic approach to national security with software orientation, creating a promotional model of the Islamic Republic, and a cultural approach to the fight against imperialism. Studies show that the moderation discourse has been effective in the fields of military security, political security, and social cohesion; has had a dual outcome in the area of economic security; and has a long way to achieve the stated goals in the field of environmental security despite some accomplishments.
 
 

Abstract Drawing on the "representation" theory in the sociology of art and the explanatory model proposed by French sociologist Pierre Félix Bourdieu, this article seeks to investigate the process of reconstructing the concept of the 1980s in the lifestyle re-presented in the top-selling movies of the 21st century. The main question asked in this article is whether the representation of the lifestyle in the 1980s in 21st century movies is in line with the Islamic Republic's discourse or not. Content analysis of some of the films produced in the modern era shows that the cultural consumption and the way the 1980s lifestyle has been portrayed in the 21st century movies have been mainly inconsistent with revolutionary values. In fact, the 1980s has been painted as a "ridiculous", "shameful" and "bygone" era in today's cinema.
 
 

Abstract Archaism as a gradual and growing phenomenon in Iranian society have cultural, political, historical, and security implications. This articles seeks to answer how this phenomenon will impact the cultural-political security of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The authors argue that the Aryan archaism discourse is different than citizen-centered nationalism and can lead to a chaotic political-cultural structure. The reason is archaism discourse is an "interpretive reaction" and a "structure-breaking narrative", which provides a platform for delegitimization and identify reassessment through "framework building", "historicism" and "representation" and poses a threat to socio-political coherence and stability through promoting "resistance identity" and "heterotrophism".
 
 

Abstract Regional developments, particularly after the Arab Spring, emergence of new crises including in Syria and Iraq, the rise of Daesh terrorists, the weakening of governments, and subsequent redefinition of the roles of regional and extra-regional actors to fill the power vacuum have rendered the need to devise a new strategy in Iran's foreign policy inevitable—a strategy that is capable of adapting to a rapidly changing environment in the region. The main assumption of this article is that the two principles of strengthening "regional cooperation" and "deterring threats from the region" (in terms of both soft and hard warfare) should be kept in balance under the new circumstances so that Iran's status can be maintained in the regional balance of power. Accordingly, the author believes that the need to gradually combine the two existing foreign policy strategies and to introduce a third strategy—referred to here as "a strong from inside Iran"—is inevitable.
 
 

Abstract This article intends to explore what approach can help the Islamic Republic of Iran and the West cooperate and interact in a desirable way in the era of globalization. The study's hypothesis is that "adopting Habermas' liberating hermeneutics based on dialogue, action, and communicative rationality as well as criticism of tradition and historical prejudices in the era of globalization can help create understanding and relative agreement between Iran and the West so that their interests can be served."
 
 

Abstract Following the victory of the Islamic Revolution and the hostage crisis, a new entity, that is the United States as an enemy, became one of the most revealing and consolidating aspects of the political identity of the Islamic Republic of Iran's establishment. With a focus on the role of political identity, this article seeks to answer the question why the Islamic Republic of Iran still insists on not having relations with the United States and refuses to make compromises with it despite all the US-led structural pressure now that four decades have passed since the victory of the revolution. The views of political realists have been used to answer this question. Political realists maintain that the friend-enemy distinction is the essence and core tenet of politics. They also argue that the strong and innate need of groups and entities to maintain a political identity rather than a structure or a desire for power underlies this distinction and emphasize the need to keep a distance from the enemy in order to survive and pursue own objectives.