Strategic Studies Quarterly

Abstract Introduction
Historically, intelligence has consistently been under political scrutiny, with intelligence elites often perceived as political servants. Intelligence, leveraging its ability to operate covertly, strives to supply the necessary data for policymakers to make informed decisions. Essentially, the primary objective of intelligence is to aid users in decision-making processes regarding potential actions. Against this background, it becomes crucial that intelligence remains unbiased and is not swayed by the political inclinations of a country’s political factions and parties, internal and external organizational interests, or the personal interests of politicians.
Intelligence operations should be conducted independently of political goals, and only the results derived should be presented to politicians. Fundamentally, intelligence agencies should prioritize national interests and remain detached from political, group, and personal interests. Thus, supporting policy-making differs from favoring a policy to the extent that objectivity is overlooked. The quintessence of the ideal relationship between intelligence and politics should be articulated as follows: Intelligence should serve the realm of politics, not its political overlords.
However, when the political environment influences intelligence to the point where intelligence outputs demonstrate a political leaning, we observe the phenomenon of intelligence politicization. Literature on intelligence indicates that politicization occurs when intelligence analysts, whether consciously or unconsciously, are swayed to generate outcomes that align with policymakers’ desires, rather than delivering the truth. This scenario represents a significant departure from the fundamental responsibility of intelligence, which is to tell the truth to those in authority.
 
Methodology
The politicization theory is formulated within the context of case studies. Essentially, it’s a research approach that involves the use of one or more case examples to construct theoretical frameworks, propositions, or mid-level theories, all of which are grounded in case-specific and empirical evidence. The key idea is that the employment of case examples forms the foundation for theory in an inductive way. In this approach, the theory evolves by identifying patterns of relationships both between and within the structures of case examples and their inherent logical arguments. This type of theory is rooted in the theorizing methodology of Paul R. Carlile and Clayton M. Christensen, following the pyramid of theorizing. Here, the politicization within intelligence agencies (both domestic and international) is examined through methods such as observation, interviews, and the study of secondary documents (library research). Following the theoretical framework of Carlile and Christensen, multiple cases were initially investigated. Subsequently, the observed elements were categorized. The relationships among the identified elements were then discerned. Ultimately, the primary propositions were established.
 
Result and Discussion
The theory of intelligence politicization encompasses two primary dimensions as detailed below:

Behavioral Dimension of Politicization

This refers to the elements that form the foundation of politicization within an intelligence organization. In the absence of these elements, politicization would not manifest. However, since some of them are inherent to the nature and essence of the intelligence organization, they internalize and institutionalize politicization. This dimension of politicization is deemed a necessary, but not sufficient precondition for the emergence of politicization in intelligence organizations. The behavioral dimension is subdivided into three categories: intelligence officer behavior, organizational behavior, and environmental behavior.
The behavior of the intelligence officer is influenced by a collection of factors that shape their individual actions. Organizational behavior is determined by factors that originate from the organization and its structure. Environmental behavior encompasses all factors that exist outside the intelligence organization, essentially residing in its external environment.

The Process Dimension of Politicization

This dimension refers to the actions and processes that give rise to politicization. By actualizing politicization, they induce alterations in the structure of politicization. This represents one of the sufficient, but not necessary, preconditions for the occurrence of politicization within intelligence organizations.
The process dimension of politicization is divided into three categories: “high process factors”, “low process factors”, and “online process factors”. The first encompasses all elements that are influenced by the policymaker to instigate politicization within the intelligence organization. The second refers to those elements that are executed by intelligence officers (except senior intelligence directors) to induce politicization. Given that in governmental bureaucracies, the appointment of directors is a critical phase in policy making and its execution, the emergence of politicization by intelligence directors is categorized separately under the third label of “online process factors”.

Abstract This paper is a comparative study of the Police Intelligence Organizations of Iran and Turkey. It is an applied study that utilized a qualitative approach and content analysis method. The library research section considered documents from the last ten years of the police intelligence organizations of both countries. Participants in the field section included deputy heads and heads of departments knowledgeable about the subject in Iran’s Police Intelligence Organization, Iran’s Interpol, Iran’s Anti-Narcotics Police, and Iranian liaison officers in Turkey. The comparison of documents from the two organizations was targeted and based on structure, content, and context using a three-pronged model. The data analysis method was a content analysis of documents and interviews. The results show that the police intelligence organizations of Iran and Turkey share commonalities in their hierarchy of authority, actions, and goals. However, differences can be observed in their formality, specialization, division of work, complexity, concentration, professionalism, technology use, environment, strategy, organizational culture, growth, and maturity. The findings also suggest that by recognizing and addressing its weaknesses - primarily related to a shortage of manpower and technology - and by reinforcing its spirit of belief, Iran's police intelligence organization can achieve significant success.

Abstract Abstract
This article seeks to examine the role of intelligence agencies in state-craft. The authors define state-craft as an intrinsic act of the government and considers the philosophy of existence of intelligence institutions as playing a role in state-craft and believe that intelligence organizations have four cognitive, supervisory, safeguarding and executive roles in order to run an efficient state-craft. This paper considers the relationship between intelligence activity and governance as a developmental relationship and believes that intelligence activity is a requirement of governance and governance is not possible without intelligence activity. The author presents three historical theoretical approaches to information, including "information as the discovery of secrets", "information as the interpretation of secrets" and "information as a tool for creating the environment" regarding the role of information in governance.

Abstract This article tries to provide an alternative theoretical framework for managing intelligence organizations and their role in national security by examining the challenges of the information age on intelligence organizations. Criticizing the traditional pattern of intelligence organizations based on the three pillars of "secret disclosure", "producer-customer relationship between information and policy" and "intelligence reporting", the author argues that the continuation of the traditional pattern in the information age and globalization cannot meet the expectations of statesmen for the effective role of intelligence agencies in national security. By presenting an alternative theoretical framework called the "Intelligence weapon", the author argues that the units and theorems of this theory about the role and function of intelligence organizations are appropriate to the age of globalization and through the production of intelligence power can Achieve national security. Instead of seeing Intelligence as an institution for discovering secrets, this theory introduces it as a weapon for covert warfare.
 
 

Abstract This study deals with the reasons of historiography of intelligence organization in political systems, a history in which much of it has been hidden from view either because of covert secrecy in intelligence activities or because of political considerations or neglect. In this study, we seek to answer the question, "How does writing and recording the history of intelligence services help national security?" The purpose of this study is to clarify the dimensions of historiography of intelligence organizations and its impact on national security. The required data were collected through secondary sources and then interviews with six experts on the subject were conducted. Data were also analyzed by thematic analysis using open coding, axial coding and selective coding. For this purpose, first the role of intelligence organizations in state craft is discussed and then the seven reasons for the historiography of intelligence organizations that are the result of research are introduced under three main dimensions.

Abstract This article tries to answer this question;  how and through what mechanism, intelligence organizations effect political stability and prevent instability? Findings of research show that intelligence organization as an independent variable, effects political stability as a dependent variable, through mediator variables such as relative deprivation, political opportunities, external factors, political anomy, legitimacy, democracy, social movements, political culture, and economic problems. In the end, author claims that the best strategy for intelligence organizations to promote and protect political stability is to focus on “cognitive actions” instead of “covert actions” and “Participation in policy making” instead of “warning”.

Abstract What is the role of intelligence organizations in foreign policy? And how is the relation of intelligence and foreign policy? Author in response to these questions numerates cognitive and executive roles of intelligence in foreign policy making and mutual relations between them. Author believes that type of foreign policy and requirements of foreign policy makers determine intelligence agenda and on the other hand, intelligence organizations by their cognitive products effect policy maker’s perception of issues and problems of foreign policy.