Strategic Studies Quarterly

Abstract  
Introduction
The concept of khurūj (rebellion) constitutes one of the central themes of Khwāja Niẓām al-Mulk’s Siyar al-Mulūk (Book of Politics), as evidenced by the fact that its longest chapters are devoted to the historical narration of rebellions and seditions (chapters 43–47). Khwāja employs the notions of khurūj/rebellion and fitna/sedition to encompass a wide range of uprisings and acts of defiance and, while emphasizing their significance, presents a detailed discussion of them as an act of counsel and goodwill toward the Seljuk state. His remarks suggest that rebellion, in his view, is a recurring phenomenon across time and space; the absence of uprisings in certain periods is attributed not to their impossibility but to the awe inspired by powerful rulers and the effectiveness of state institutions. Khwāja’s tendency to classify a broad spectrum of movements—including Sinbād the Infidel, the Mazdakites, the Khurramites, and various Shiʿi groups, particularly the Ismailis and the Qarmatians—within a single category raises an important question: what common feature did he perceive among these diverse movements, and what form of unity did he discern beneath their apparent diversity?
Methodology
To clarify Khwāja Niẓām al-Mulk’s understanding of rebellion, this study adopts a minimal hermeneutic approach in reading his historical text. This approach is based on the assumption of the author’s intellectual coherence, the presence of a unified underlying logic throughout the work, and the application of the principle of charity. In order to identify and explain the unity underlying diverse manifestations of rebellion, the analysis also draws on a metaphysical framework in the Aristotelian sense—namely, the search for an ultimate principle or final cause beneath multiplicity and variation. The objective is to determine what, in Khwāja’s view, lay behind the heterogeneous ideas and claims advanced by rebels and seditionists.
Findings and Discussion
The analysis indicates that Khwāja Niẓām al-Mulk clearly distinguishes between the cunning and manipulative leaders of rebellions and the masses who followed them. The largely ignorant populace tended to act as mere followers and was willing to comply with even the unreasonable demands of their leaders—including the abandonment of religious obligations—often motivated by the prospect of modest gains. By contrast, the leaders of rebellions and uprisings were typically intelligent and frequently drawn from elite circles. Khwāja’s remarks suggest that the primary causes of rebellion can be reduced to two main factors: first, the pursuit of power, wealth, and fame, accompanied by submission to personal desires and the instrumental use of religious beliefs to conceal genuine intentions; and second, the deception and misguidance of individuals holding erroneous beliefs.
Conclusion
This interpretation, however, gives rise to a fundamental paradox. If the emergence of every new belief or ideology—and the social and political transformations that follow—is attributed to such flawed and suspect motives, how should the founders of accepted religions and legitimate sects be understood? Moreover, does this perspective not risk legitimizing whichever religion happens to be endorsed by those in power as the true faith? To address this paradox, two possible explanations are proposed. The first emphasizes Khwāja’s political pragmatism, suggesting that he prioritizes considerations of political expediency without presupposing a single, coherent metaphysical framework, focusing instead on practical governance. The second points to the possibility of later textual interpolations, omissions, or alterations introduced by scribes after Khwāja’s death, shaped by the political and intellectual conditions of subsequent periods.

Abstract Introduction
The shift of the social lifeworld from state-centric and bureaucratic structures to platform-based and algorithmic architectures represents one of the most significant theoretical and institutional transformations in contemporary public law. A direct consequence of this shift is the reconfiguration of the concept and function of “public order,” historically one of the foundational notions in public law. In traditional legal frameworks, public order was grounded in explicit rules, state authority, public interest, and the normative regulation of social behavior. In contrast, the platform era has transferred the logic of order to computational mechanisms, digital architectures, and recommendation algorithms. What was once the product of legislative intent and human decision-making is now generated and guided by transnational, data-driven, and opaque platforms.
This study addresses the central question: How is “public order” redefined under these conditions, and how should Iran’s legal system reproduce legitimacy, accountability, and human dignity in response to the rise of platform-mediated and algorithmic governance?
The research is structured according to three principal lines of inquiry: First, a historical-conceptual analysis of public order in the Shi’a jurisprudential and constitutional tradition of Iran, demonstrating that the concept has primarily functioned as protective, security-oriented, and authority-centered, with limited linkage to modern public policy. Second, a conceptual examination of digital public order in contemporary scholarship, drawing on theories such as “law as code,” “network society,” and “surveillance capitalism,” which illustrate that in the platform era, order is infrastructural and computational rather than purely normative. Third, a comparative analysis of policy-making and regulation in the European Union and Germany, considered leading models, with a comparison to Iran, which currently lacks the institutional, legislative, and regulatory frameworks required to address automated decision-making.
Methodology
This research employs an analytical-comparative methodology grounded in document analysis. Data were sourced from European Union legislation and practices, German regulatory documents (including Federal Data Protection Commissioner guidelines and Constitutional Court rulings), Iranian legal instruments (Smart Government Roadmap, National Artificial Intelligence Strategy, Supreme Council of Cyberspace resolutions), and theoretical literature on digital governance. The study’s theoretical framework is based on the concept of “infrastructural public order,” emphasizing that in the contemporary era, order is established not at the level of individual behavior but at the level of code architecture, platform design, and algorithmic decision-making logic.
Findings and Discussion
The analysis identifies three intertwined layers of public order in the platform transformation era:

Normative layer: Core values such as human dignity, digital justice, transparency, and the right to explanation replace traditional concepts of moral security and administrative order.
Institutional layer: Governments must transition from centralized, reactive governance to participatory, data-driven, and multi-level governance. Experiences in the European Union and Germany demonstrate that independent regulatory agencies, ethics councils, algorithmic audits, and effective judicial oversight are essential for achieving digital public order.
Technological-architectural layer: Order is generated through code, user interface design, machine learning models, and algorithmic logic. This layer is the most consequential in platform public order, as it profoundly influences social behavior and public decision-making while remaining the least transparent and accountable.

Comparative analysis shows that the European Union has elevated public order from a security- and discipline-centered model to one that is dignity-oriented and infrastructural by institutionalizing principles such as the “right to explanation,” “right to erasure,” algorithmic audits, risk management, and multi-level governance. In Germany, the Constitutional Court, citing the principle of human dignity, has recognized the necessity of a “human-in-the-loop” as a condition of digital public order. Regulatory bodies such as the Federal Network Agency and the Data Protection Commissioner provide important models for ex-ante oversight, impact assessment, and algorithmic transparency.
In contrast, Iran’s legal system is conceptually, institutionally, and legislatively underdeveloped. Administrative decisions remain primarily based on the “human will of competent authorities,” although many critical decisions (e.g., subsidies, ranking, resource allocation, and qualification assessments) are effectively executed through automated systems. No legal distinction exists between human, semi-automated, and fully automated decisions. Independent regulatory institutions for algorithmic governance are absent, and digital policy-making is dispersed across numerous agencies. Furthermore, no comprehensive law defines dignity-centered criteria, algorithmic transparency, rights of appeal, or technical auditing. This has produced a form of “non-accountable cyber bureaucracy,” in which intelligent decisions are executed without legal identity or effective remedies.
Redefining public order in Iran should be based on three principles: digital human dignity as the foundation of modern public law; algorithmic accountability and transparency as a condition of legitimacy; and the establishment of new institutional mechanisms for the regulation of platforms, data, and artificial intelligence. The Shi’a governmental jurisprudential tradition offers normative resources for embedding principles such as justice, the prohibition of oppression, trustworthiness, and system preservation into a dignity-centered framework for algorithmic governance.
Conclusion
This study argues that transitioning to a digital government era is impossible without redefining “digital public order.” In this era, public order is not merely a tool for safeguarding security but a framework for regulating the human-algorithm relationship. Policy-making in Iran must move away from security-centered reactions toward a proactive, dignity-centered, participatory, and infrastructural model of public order. This transformation requires the enactment of comprehensive algorithmic governance legislation, the establishment of an independent regulatory body, amendments to the Administrative Justice Act to encompass algorithmic decisions, and the design of legal mechanisms ensuring explainability, appealability, and auditability. Only under these conditions can Iran’s digital government operate in a legitimate, accountable, just, and public law-compliant manner.

Abstract Introduction
Historical analysis indicates that confrontation between opposing forces has been a persistent and enduring feature of human societies. Over time, warfare has evolved from rudimentary tactics into increasingly complex and multidimensional systems. First- through fourth-generation wars, each characterized by distinct features, have collectively shaped the evolution of warfare. Since the early 1990s, however, human beings and social systems have emerged as central elements of conflict, giving rise to a novel cognitive dimension within the traditional domains of war.
Cognitive warfare fundamentally constitutes a battlefield of minds, where the primary goal is to manipulate and transform individuals’ perceptual frameworks, beliefs, values, and decision-making processes. In this arena, humans function not only as targets but also as instruments of strategic influence. By leveraging modern media, social engineering, cyber operations, and advanced technologies, cognitive warfare enables actors to impose their will on adversaries without direct physical confrontation.
Despite the increasing significance of cognitive warfare in military, political, and societal contexts, the literature remains fragmented, often addressing narrow aspects of the phenomenon. To date, no comprehensive conceptual framework has been established to systematically define its key characteristics. Accordingly, the present study employs a meta-synthesis approach to integrate and interpret existing research, aiming to develop a comprehensive conceptual model that elucidates the core dimensions of cognitive warfare and provides a clear operational understanding within the sphere of modern warfare.
Methodology
To provide a holistic interpretation of cognitive warfare’s conceptual dimensions, this study adopts a meta-synthesis methodology based on the Mark W. Lipsey and David B. Wilson framework. The research process included the following stages:

Formulation of research questions
Systematic literature review
Identification and screening of relevant studies
Data extraction from selected studies
Qualitative analysis and synthesis of findings
Assessment of reliability and validity (quality control)
Presentation of results (utilizing Shannon entropy)

During the systematic review, scholarly articles published between 2017 and 2023 were retrieved from reputable national and international databases. Of 92 studies, 31 were ultimately selected as the primary data sources for the meta-synthesis.
Data from these studies were coded and categorized as either domestic or international. Extracted codes were then integrated using a comparative approach and organized into conceptual categories. In the analytical phase, Shannon entropy was employed to evaluate the relative importance of each code and the extent of support it received within the literature.
The study’s validity was ensured through both quantitative and qualitative measures. Quantitatively, the Kappa coefficient was calculated at 0.684, indicating substantial inter-coder agreement. Qualitatively, an independent expert conducted a secondary review. Additional criteria, including procedural transparency and the quality of the selected studies, were considered to strengthen the trustworthiness of the findings.
Findings and Discussion
The meta-synthesis yielded 12 core categories, 35 secondary codes, and 144 primary codes, forming the basis of the proposed conceptual model of cognitive warfare. The model addresses twelve defining dimensions: characteristics, objectives, tools, operational levels, methods and strategies, indicators of implementation, consequences, countermeasures, target audiences, domains of conflict, related concepts, and national approaches to cognitive warfare.
Shannon entropy analysis revealed that certain components—such as “management and transformation of societal perception,” “influence on the general public,” “use of social media,” and “societal polarization”—exhibit the highest significance in the literature. These were identified as key conceptual elements of cognitive warfare.
Integrating the findings of the 31 studies, the following definition of cognitive warfare is proposed:
Cognitive warfare is a coordinated set of covert, virtual, fluid, and software-mediated actions that leverage “information as content” and “modern media as tools” to intentionally control and modify human cognitive capacities (mind, emotions, and subconscious). Its objectives include erasing historical memory, altering behavioral patterns, and ultimately imposing will upon the political and social systems of the target society.
Conclusion
The evolution of warfare demonstrates a persistent inclination toward imposing will upon adversaries without direct confrontation, a trend that has shifted from physical domains to informational and cognitive arenas. Cognitive warfare, as the advanced manifestation of this trend, utilizes information, modern media, and sophisticated technologies to deliberately influence perception, decision-making, and behavior within target societies, undermining social capital and public trust.
The conceptual model developed in this study provides a clear and practical framework for understanding cognitive warfare and lays the groundwork for further research on related concepts, countermeasures, and threat assessment. The findings indicate that cognitive warfare has become a strategic priority for major powers, playing a pivotal role in shaping political, social, and cultural systems.
Theoretically, this study represents a significant contribution to the literature by systematically conceptualizing the multidimensional nature of cognitive warfare within a structured, multi-level model using a meta-synthesis approach. Effective understanding and counteraction of this phenomenon require moving beyond a solely security-focused perspective and recognizing cognitive warfare as inherently interdisciplinary, integrating insights from cognitive science, social psychology, communication studies, technology, and political science.
From a practical perspective, the findings highlight the need to foster cognitive literacy at societal and governance levels. Key strategies include developing resilient networks against information manipulation, strengthening social trust, enhancing critical thinking education, and establishing ethical frameworks for the application of cognitive technologies.
Ultimately, the proposed conceptual model provides a validated framework to guide future research and serves as a foundation for national policy formulation in cognitive security, complementing existing cyber and psychological security strategies.

Abstract  
Introduction
The concept of the national dream plays a pivotal role in shaping collective identity, orienting social aspirations, and structuring patterns of governance. Rather than constituting a merely idealized vision, the national dream encompasses cognitive, emotional, and behavioral dimensions that, over time, organize both individual and collective action within a society. In the contemporary world, many states have consciously sought to redefine or reconstruct their national dreams in order to strengthen social cohesion, enhance political legitimacy, and increase collective action capacity.
Despite its significance, much of the existing scholarship has examined the national dream primarily through political, historical, or sociological lenses, while paying comparatively limited attention to its cognitive and mental foundations. In this context, cognitive science—an interdisciplinary field concerned with the study of mental, perceptual, and emotional processes—offers a novel and productive framework for understanding how national dreams are formed, stabilized, and transmitted. Concepts such as collective memory, social cognition, empathy, theory of mind, belief formation, and social decision-making provide powerful analytical tools for illuminating the internal and often invisible processes underlying the construction of collective dreams.
The importance of the present study lies in its attempt to draw on insights from cognitive science to explain the mental and neural foundations of the national dream, thereby addressing a notable theoretical gap in the literature. The central research question guiding this inquiry is: How does the national dream emerge from a cognitive science perspective, and what mental and social mechanisms contribute to its formation and durability? Accordingly, the objectives of the study include examining the role of collective memory in representing the past and linking it to national foresight; analyzing the function of social cognition in generating shared understanding among members of society; exploring the role of emotion and empathy in mobilizing collective participation; and investigating the contribution of theory of mind, belief, and desire to the alignment of individual actions with collective goals.
This research does not seek to test statistical hypotheses. Instead, adopting an exploratory approach, it aims to develop a conceptual framework for understanding the process of “collective dream formation.” The primary focus is on how dispersed cognitive processes at the individual level are transformed—through social interaction, shared narratives, and common experiences—into a coherent vision of the future capable of organizing social and political behavior.
Methodology
This study employs a qualitative research design and follows a descriptive–analytical approach, situating it within the realm of interdisciplinary research. Data were collected through documentary and library-based methods and include peer-reviewed journal articles, specialized monographs, and research reports in the fields of cognitive science, social neuroscience, social psychology, and national identity studies. The sources reviewed span the period from 2000 to 2024 and were selected based on their conceptual relevance, academic credibility, and currency.
The theoretical framework is grounded in key concepts of social cognition, including collective memory as a repository of shared historical experiences; theory of mind as the capacity to attribute mental states to others; empathy as an emotional mechanism linking individuals; and belief and desire as fundamental drivers of human behavior. In addition, the notion of the “social brain” and the neural networks associated with social interaction provide an explanatory basis for understanding why collective dreams are not merely discursive constructions, but are rooted in human cognitive and affective structures. Data analysis was conducted through thematic extraction and the systematic examination of relationships among core concepts, with findings presented in the form of analytical propositions.
Findings and Discussion
The findings indicate that the national dream emerges from the interaction between past-oriented collective memory and future-oriented imagination. Collective memory serves to stabilize common experiences, while cognitive processes transform these experiences into a meaningful vision for the future. Social cognition and empathy play a central role in the transmission and internalization of this vision; without emotional engagement and empathic resonance, even the most rationally articulated national dreams lack the capacity to mobilize society.
Moreover, the results demonstrate that theory of mind—the ability to understand the perspectives, beliefs, and intentions of others—is a necessary condition for the formation of integrated national dreams and for the reduction of intergroup tensions. Collective beliefs, consciously or implicitly, constitute the deepest layers shaping social behavior. Consequently, any attempt to reformulate or redesign a national dream is unlikely to succeed without a clear understanding of these underlying belief structures.
Conclusion
In sum, this study shows that the national dream is not merely a political or discursive construct, but a phenomenon deeply embedded in human cognitive and neural mechanisms. Attention to these underlying infrastructures can assist policymakers, educational institutions, and media organizations in designing cultural and social interventions that are both more realistic and more effective. The findings of this study contribute theoretically to the literature on social cognitive science and have practical implications for governance, social cohesion, and national foresight.

Abstract  
Introduction
This study applies the theoretical framework of “compounding crises” to examine the interconnections among security, political, and economic threats in Pakistan and their direct implications for the national security of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Unlike traditional approaches that consider threats in isolation, this research demonstrates that the simultaneous occurrence of multiple crises in Pakistan does not constitute a series of isolated challenges. Rather, it represents a coordinated and mutually reinforcing process that has significantly eroded the central government’s capacity across operational, financial, and legitimacy dimensions. This situation has direct consequences for Iran’s eastern borders and its broader security environment.
Pakistan exemplifies a state confronted with concurrent and intensifying crises: from fundamentalist terrorism led by Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and ISIS-Khorasan, to separatist insurgencies in Balochistan and Sindh, and to geopolitical tensions with India and Afghanistan. The structural interlinkages among these crises have weakened Pakistan’s internal security and generated substantial spillover threats to Iran. Understanding the dynamics of compounding crises is therefore crucial for the formulation of Iran’s security policy.
Methodology
This study adopts a qualitative-interpretive approach. Data were collected from three primary sources:
1.      Documentary analysis, including authoritative security reports and data from regional research centers;
2.      Statistical data relating to security, terrorism, the economy, and public policy;
3.      Semi-structured interviews with Iranian diplomats and experts in regional security.
The study applies the compounding crises framework to examine how these crises interact and erode state capacity across operational, economic, and legitimacy dimensions. This framework provides a coherent and systematic understanding of the cross-cutting effects of crises, revealing the multi-layered weakening of Pakistan’s state structures.
Findings and Discussion
Three primary categories of crises in Pakistan were identified:
1.      Fundamentalist terrorism: The main actors are TTP and ISIS-Khorasan. Following developments in Afghanistan in 2021, these groups gained greater strategic depth and significantly intensified attacks in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan. Data from Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS) indicate that terrorist attacks increased by over 112% in 2024, with an additional 81% rise in the first quarter of 2025. This trend reflects a substantial escalation in violence and a growing erosion of Pakistan’s military operational capacity.
2.      Baloch and Sindhi separatist insurgencies: These groups have targeted critical infrastructure, including projects associated with the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), energy networks, and foreign investors—particularly Chinese—thereby generating heightened security and economic threats. The “Majid Brigade”, as the suicide wing of the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA), has played a key role in operations against Pakistan’s strategic objectives.
3.      Border-related geopolitical crises: Tensions with India over Kashmir and ongoing instability along the Afghan border have led to asymmetric military deployments in Pakistan, reducing the army’s capacity to address internal threats and undermining effective crisis management.
The analysis further highlights:
·         Operational erosion: Pakistan’s military is engaged in a multi-front, attritional conflict, weakening strategic deterrence and limiting its ability to stabilize border regions.
·         Financial erosion: Security and counterterrorism expenditures exceed 4% of GDP. Alongside declining foreign investment and reliance on the IMF, Pakistan’s economy is trapped in a cycle of recession and insecurity.
·         Political legitimacy erosion: The government’s inability to manage multiple crises simultaneously has reduced public trust, intensified dissatisfaction, and weakened the military’s authority within the political system, severely constraining decision-making.
This issue also has the following implications for Iran:
1.      Security vacuum arising from Pakistan’s operational weaknesses has facilitated increased activity by terrorist groups such as Jaish al-Adl.
2.      Economic fragility has expanded informal economies across the Iran-Pakistan border, providing sustainable financial resources for terrorist organizations.
3.      Political instability and fragmented decision-making in Pakistan have reduced the effectiveness of bilateral security cooperation and increased the likelihood of border tensions.
Conclusion
Pakistan’s crises are cross-cutting, synergistic, and self-reinforcing, and the threats spilling over to Iran share these characteristics. Consequently, the security of Iran and Pakistan is mutually interdependent, and managing emerging threats requires a multidimensional and systematic approach. Three key strategies are proposed:
1.      Strengthen and institutionalize security and intelligence cooperation with Pakistan;
2.      Promote socio-economic development in Iran’s border regions to reduce the drivers of insecurity;
3.      Strategically manage geopolitical relations with China and India, given their influence on Pakistan’s crises.
In conclusion, only a comprehensive approach grounded in the understanding of compounding crises can effectively prevent the spread of insecurity along Iran’s eastern borders.

 

Abstract  
Introduction
In recent years, the intensification of great-power competition—most notably between the United States and China—has increased ambiguity and uncertainty within the international system. This development has heightened both the incentive and the necessity for middle powers to reassess their foreign policy strategies. One of the most prominent approaches in contemporary international relations scholarship is “hedging,” which is commonly conceptualized as a strategy aimed at reducing the risks of unilateral dependence while expanding strategic flexibility in the context of major power rivalry.
Hedging operates through a combination of practical mechanisms, including the maintenance of strategic ambiguity, diversification of external partnerships, leveraging national advantages, and the adoption of deliberately selective or even contradictory policy behaviors. Through these means, the strategy seeks to minimize the economic and security costs associated with full alignment with a single great power and to enhance room for maneuver in foreign policy. For a middle power such as Iran—whose external environment is deeply shaped by U.S.–China competition—hedging carries both analytical and practical relevance. Nevertheless, the practical implementation of this strategy encounters significant challenges, which constitute the central focus of this study.
Methodology
This research adopts a qualitative–analytical approach and employs a multi-level analysis framework. This method enables the simultaneous examination of factors operating at different levels and prevents the inappropriate generalization of findings from one level of analysis (such as the individual level) to another (such as the structural level). Accordingly, the study proceeds across three analytical levels:

Operational level: First, the operational components of hedging are identified; subsequently, the feasibility of implementing these components within the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran, as well as the associated operational challenges, is assessed.
Structural level: At this level, the study examines whether the structure of great-power competition in the international system—specifically U.S.–China rivalry—provides sufficient space for Iran to pursue a hedging strategy. The structural constraints on hedging are therefore critically evaluated.
Functional level: This level assesses the desirability and effectiveness of hedging as a foreign policy strategy for Iran.

Findings and Discussion
At the operational level, effective hedging requires the adoption of a deliberately ambiguous foreign policy posture. However, such ambiguity is fundamentally at odds with the established identity of the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran, as well as with the geopolitical realities of the West Asia region.
At the structural level, the United States has effectively pursued a strategy of denial toward Iran by imposing multilayered sanctions and targeting the country’s economic and security foundations. This approach has rendered Iran’s efforts at balanced engagement with the West largely ineffective, let alone allowing room for incorporating the United States into Iran’s security calculus. Moreover, available evidence suggests that U.S. policy toward Iran is, at certain levels, intertwined with Washington’s broader strategy to contain China. In this context, pressure on Iran is treated as an integral component of the U.S. approach to China containment. Moreover, the U.S.’s punitive approach toward Iran’s strategic ties with China and Russia has further constrained the space needed for effective hedging.
At the functional level, the findings indicate that, under current conditions, hedging does not necessarily lead to a reduction in Iran’s economic and security risks. In the absence of essential operational and structural preconditions, the adoption of a hedging strategy may instead increase uncertainty, perpetuate external pressures, and weaken Iran’s ability to effectively exploit international opportunities.
Conclusion
This study demonstrates that the implementation of hedging in the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran faces substantial operational, structural, and functional challenges. More specifically, the findings reveal a significant gap between the theoretical promises of hedging and its practical outcomes in the Iranian case. Nevertheless, the study argues against a wholesale rejection of hedging as a strategic option for Iran. Instead, it suggests the adoption of modified and issue-specific forms of hedging, such as hedging within the context of China–Russia competition, playing an active role as a hedging option among regional countries, or pursuing selective ambiguity toward extra-regional crises. These approaches should be complemented by domestic reinforcing measures—including sanctions mitigation through governance reform and the enhancement of economic capacity—in order to create the necessary preconditions for a more effective implementation of hedging in the future.