Strategic Studies Quarterly

Abstract Introduction Security is a fundamental human need, and every normative system conceptualizes it in accordance with its own values and objectives. In Imami Shi'a jurisprudence, security is not treated as a distinct legal category. Rather, its various dimensions are addressed through concepts such as defensive jihad, preservation of the integrity of Islam, repelling aggression, maintaining social order, and protecting religious rites. Understanding the significance of security in the works of early Shi'a jurists therefore requires reconstructing the relationship among these concepts. To understand the significance of this issue in the political jurisprudence of Shaykh Ja'far Kashif al-Ghita, it is necessary to consider the historical context of his time. At the beginning of the thirteenth century AH (late eighteenth century CE), Shi'a communities faced two distinct forms of threat: incursions by the Russian Empire, which endangered Islamic territories and Muslim lives, and Wahhabi attacks on the Shi'a holy cities, which combined threats to religious and communal identity with physical insecurity. Although Kashif al-Ghita did not regard the Qajar monarchy as inherently legitimate, he authorized Fath-Ali Shah to mobilize forces for the defense of Islamic territories. This raises a fundamental question: How did his jurisprudence permit the use of the ruler's political and military capacities for the fulfillment of the duty of defense without conferring inherent legitimacy on the monarchy? The central research question is: How can the security logic of Kashif al-Ghita's political jurisprudence be reconstructed through his jurisprudential concepts and rulings, and what mechanism does his thought provide for regulating the relationship among Sharia, political authority, and active defense in response to threats? The study argues that the central concept underlying this security logic is “preserving the integrity of Islam” (hifz-e bayza-ye Islam). When a serious threat emerges, Sharia activates its protective functions through rulings concerning defensive jihad, the protection of religious rites, and the granting of limited authorization to political authority. Security, therefore, is not externally imposed on Sharia; rather, the presence of a threat elevates its significance as a jurisprudential principle and brings it to the forefront. Methodology The study employs a descriptive-analytical approach based on a close reading of Kashif al-Ghita's Kashf al-Ghita and his treatises on jihad, with particular attention to the historical context in which his views were articulated. To avoid conceptual anachronism, the study distinguishes between the jurist's own terminology and the analytical concepts used to interpret his thought. The theoretical framework consists of three levels: Islamic political philosophy, which views security as a condition for the possibility of collective social life; jurisprudence, which translates this foundation into the normative objective of “preservation”; and the question of the “referent of security,” through which concepts such as the preservation of the integrity of Islam and dar al-Islam (lands under Islamic rule) are identified as the principal objects of protection. Findings and Discussion The referent of security. In Kashif al-Ghita's political jurisprudence, security cannot be reduced to the ruler or the state. His ruling on jihad against Russia was not intended to defend the ruler personally, but was justified in terms of preserving Islam. The primary referent of security is the “foundation of Islam,” a fundamental entity on which the survival of religion, social order, territorial frontiers, and religious rites depends. This referent encompasses several interconnected levels: the integrity of Islam, dar al-Islam, the Muslim community, and religious rites. Addressing military threats. In Kashif al-Ghita's jurisprudence, confronting military threats constitutes a religious obligation under the category of defensive jihad. A distinctive feature of his jurisprudence is what this study conceptualizes as “delegated security authority.” When a jurist lacks the material means necessary to exercise political and military power, he may authorize a capable ruler to undertake the practical task of providing security. By granting religious authorization to Fath-Ali Shah, Kashif al-Ghita placed the ruler in the position of an agent responsible for organizing defense. The Qajar monarch was therefore neither the referent of security nor the source of the legitimacy of defense. Rather, he functioned as an executive authority acting under the jurist's authorization. Addressing intellectual and religious threats. In Kashif al-Ghita's thought, threats are not limited to physical aggression. Any development that undermines the intellectual and religious cohesion of the Muslim community may constitute a broader security threat. Insults against the Prophet Muhammad, because of their potentially disruptive impact on the foundations of the religious community, give rise to a collective obligation and require Muslims to respond to them. The dialectic of Sharia and security. The “dialectic of Sharia and security” in this context does not imply a conflict or contradiction between security and the requirements of Sharia. Within Kashif al-Ghita's jurisprudential framework, security is not introduced as an external, non-religious interest. Rather, it is derived from concepts such as protecting the integrity of Islam and defending the frontiers of dar al-Islam. This relationship operates through two mechanisms: changes in legal rulings resulting from changes in the subject matter, and the principle that more important legal considerations take precedence in times of crisis. Conclusion The central finding of the study is that the “referent of security” in Kashif al-Ghita's political jurisprudence is neither the monarchy nor the state, but the foundation and integrity of Islam. His ruling on jihad against Russia should therefore be understood not as an endorsement of Qajar rule, but as a religiously grounded defense of the frontiers of dar al-Islam. An examination of the concept of “authorized monarchy” (saltanat-e ma'zun) shows that Kashif al-Ghita distinguished between the inherent legitimacy of political authority and the functional authorization granted to an existing ruler. His authorization of the Qajar monarch did not amount to an absolute legitimation of the monarchy. Rather, it constituted a limited authorization to organize and conduct defensive action. From this perspective, security in Kashif al-Ghita's thought does not represent a departure from Sharia. Instead, it constitutes an important domain through which the objectives of Sharia become operative in protecting Islam and the Muslim community.

Abstract Introduction The migration of highly skilled professionals and academics is a major structural challenge for developing countries, including Iran, with significant economic, social, and national security implications. Previous studies have largely explained this phenomenon in terms of push and pull factors within the framework of national borders. In today's increasingly interconnected world, however, the movement of knowledge, capital, and human talent is shaped less by political boundaries than by global networks of connectivity. Drawing on Parag Khanna's theory of connectography, which examines countries' positions within global networks of infrastructure, flows, hubs, governance, geoeconomics, and resilience, this study approaches elite migration as a networked and transnational phenomenon. It asks: What structural factors are likely to shape future scenarios of elite migration from Iran, and how can these scenarios be managed to strengthen national security? Methodology The study adopts a strategic foresight approach and employs a mixed-method design conducted in three stages. First, a review of the literature and systematic analysis of relevant sources identified twenty factors influencing elite migration. These factors were organized into eight clusters across six dimensions of Khanna's connectography framework. Second, eight experts in demography, sociology, science and technology policy, and political science participated in constructing an 8×8 cross-impact matrix. The matrix was analyzed using MICMAC to distinguish among the system's driving, linkage, dependent, and autonomous variables. Third, the two most influential drivers, governance and institutions and global flows, were identified as critical uncertainties. Using the GBN scenario framework, four alternative scenarios for the future of elite migration were then developed. Findings and Discussion The indirect cross-impact analysis showed that governance and institutions exert the greatest influence on the system and constitute its primary driving force. Global flows, by contrast, exhibit both high influence and high dependence, giving them a dual and intermediary role. Scientific and educational infrastructure and digital infrastructure also emerged as linkage variables. Scientific hubs and individual and family characteristics, however, were found to be more responsive to changes in other components of the system. Resilience and social capital emerged as the least influential factors. The interaction between the two key drivers produced four scenarios. In “Active Talent Circulation,” effective governance combined with strong global flows promotes transnational cooperation and the return of highly skilled professionals. In “Connected Brain Drain,” weak governance and strong global flows sustain emigration while allowing emigrant talent to maintain connections with the country. In “Endogenous and Sustainable Development,” effective governance combined with weak global flows pushes the country toward a development model based primarily on domestic capacities and characterized by relative isolation from the outside world. The most adverse scenario, “Talent Stagnation and Isolation,” emerges when weak governance coincides with limited global flows, resulting in largely irreversible, one-way emigration of highly skilled professionals. The findings suggest that Iran's current position falls somewhere between these four scenarios but is closer to the fourth. This trajectory appears to be driven less by the individual motivations of highly skilled professionals than by weaknesses in governance structures and institutional inefficiency. Conclusion By moving beyond linear and single-cause explanations toward a systemic and network-based perspective, this study identifies governance and institutions and global flows as the two central dimensions for managing elite migration. Based on these findings, five policy strategies are proposed: Redesigning the governance of science and technology around merit-based principles; Establishing a national platform to connect with the scientific diaspora and channel brain drain toward brain circulation; Reforming the research funding system to enhance international competitiveness; Facilitating international scientific engagement by removing access barriers and streamlining visa procedures; and Developing a ten-year national strategy for talent migration with a designated lead institution. The findings indicate that effectively addressing elite migration requires simultaneous action on both domestic and global fronts. Relying solely on restrictive domestic policies, without strategically managing the country's connections to global knowledge networks, is unlikely to provide an effective response.

Abstract Introduction
Tourism, as both a major revenue-generating industry and a modern social phenomenon, has far-reaching effects on the promotion and transformation of the cultures of different societies. Although the Islamic Republic of Iran was among the pioneering countries in the region to incorporate tourism into its overarching policy documents, it has failed to implement these policies in a coherent and sustainable manner. This challenge can largely be attributed to weaknesses in the formulation of policy and legislative documents based on a theoretically grounded policy framework, as well as shortcomings in implementation and governance mechanisms.
Despite its civilizational diversity, religious heritage, and extensive cultural resources, the Islamic world continues to have a relatively limited and fragmented presence in the global tourism system. This situation can partly be attributed to the dominance of economically oriented approaches and the absence of coherent cultural policymaking. In the Islamic Republic of Iran, the lack of an indigenous theoretical framework for cultural policymaking in tourism has resulted in conceptual fragmentation and a lack of alignment between cultural objectives and practical considerations in existing policies and programs. Against this background, this study introduces the concept of spiritual tourism as its theoretical core. Spiritual tourism conceptualizes travel as an opportunity to enhance awareness, deepen spiritual experiences, and foster moral virtues in both individuals and society.
The main research question is how spiritual tourism can be conceptualized within cultural policymaking in the Islamic world and what theoretical and institutional requirements are necessary for its implementation. The primary objective of the study is to introduce spiritual tourism as a theoretical foundation for tourism policymaking. The subsidiary questions concern the conceptualization of spiritual tourism within the framework of the New Islamic Civilization, the role of Islamic sciences and jurisprudence in shaping spiritual tourism, and its different forms and manifestations.
Methodology
This study adopts a qualitative research approach. Data were collected through documentary and library research and an expert focus group. SWOT analysis was employed to identify implementation strategies. Internal and external factors were assessed by a five-member expert panel comprising graduates of both Islamic seminaries and universities.
For the formulation of policy recommendations, the study combines rational and incremental approaches. The rational approach was employed to define overarching objectives and formulate a vision of the desired future. This was pursued through Causal Layered Analysis (CLA), encompassing four levels: litany, social causes, discourse/worldview, and myth/metaphor. The incremental approach was applied at the implementation stage through the identification and assessment of internal and external factors in the SWOT matrix.
Findings and Discussion
Causal Layered Analysis of the Existing Drivers of Tourism in the Islamic World: At the litany level, factors such as enjoyment, recreation, vitality, and relief from fatigue are identified. At the level of social causes, structural factors, leisure-time activities, revenue generation, and the development of the transportation industry are emphasized. At the worldview level, concepts such as travel, global tourism, familiarity with other cultures, and an emphasis on nature can be identified. At the myth/metaphor level, escape from suffering, hedonism, and the pursuit of variety constitute the dominant myth/metaphor underlying contemporary tourism.
Causal Layered Analysis of the Ideal Drivers of Tourism in the Islamic World: At the litany level, the objectives include countering Islamophobia, promoting the higher teachings of Islam, restoring historical monuments, fostering hope, and generating sustainable revenue. At the social level, the emphasis is placed on strengthening Muslim solidarity, consolidating Islamic identity, promoting justice and employment, and protecting the environment. At the worldview level, key values include learning from history and experience, education, gaining a deeper understanding of religion, reflecting on the external and internal dimensions of existence, fostering unity, and serving society. At the myth/metaphor level, human flourishing and spiritual advancement constitute the central concept of the desired ideal, given that the elevation and perfection of human beings are among the principal ends of divine laws.
Assessment of Internal and External Factors: The overall scores for the internal and external factor evaluation matrices were 2.64 and 2.57, respectively. Since both scores exceed 2.5, the findings indicate that the internal strengths and external opportunities of tourism in the Islamic world outweigh its weaknesses and threats. Accordingly, aggressive (SO) strategies should be pursued.
Conclusion
Spiritual tourism reorients cultural tourism policymaking from a myth/metaphor centered on pleasure and the waste of time toward one centered on material development and spiritual advancement. At the social level, it shifts the emphasis from the collective values of the secular world toward Islamic social values, including solidarity within the Muslim ummah and the strengthening of Islamic identity. At the other analytical levels, it likewise entails a shift from a discourse centered on travel and tourism toward one focused on learning from experience and the acquisition of knowledge.
By combining rational and incremental approaches, the study proposes several strategies, including foresight, spatial planning and feasibility assessment for tourism development, the identification and development of tangible and intangible tourism attractions, the use of emerging promotional and communication capacities, the restoration of historical monuments, and the strengthening of tourism infrastructure. Based on the SWOT matrix, additional strategies include establishing civilizational tourism startups, developing ecotourism and community-based tourism, establishing an Islamic World Tourism Center within the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), organizing tours of Islamic capitals, utilizing metaverse-based services, developing medical tourism, and promoting elite tourism.

Abstract Introduction In the political science literature, opposition is generally conceptualized as an endogenous political force that emerges from civil society and serves either to promote political reform or to constrain those in power. This understanding is rooted largely in the historical experience of liberal nation-states in the Global North and has often been extended to societies in the Global South without sufficient attention to their distinct historical, political, and structural contexts. Applying the concept of opposition to the Global South without accounting for structural inequalities in the international distribution of power, however, raises important analytical challenges. Many countries in the Global South, particularly those subject to geopolitical confrontation, economic sanctions, political pressure, and external intervention, operate within a broader environment shaped by economic, financial, media, and security pressures exerted by dominant global powers. Under such circumstances, the boundary between autonomous political action and political activity facilitated or supported by external actors can become blurred. This study is significant because overlooking the distinction between endogenous opposition and opposition aligned with dominant powers can lead to misinterpretations of political developments in the Global South and, consequently, to the formulation of misguided security strategies. The central research question is whether opposition groups in the Global South invariably play an endogenous and emancipatory role or whether, in some contexts, they can become instruments through which structures of global domination are reproduced. The paper hypothesizes that, in some cases, particularly in countries engaged in strategic confrontation with dominant powers, opposition groups may reinforce rather than challenge structures of global domination. Through external institutional and financial ties, support for economic sanctions, and the acceptance or normalization of external pressure and military intervention, such groups may contribute to the reproduction of global structures of domination. Methodology This study employs a qualitative research approach and a comparative case-study design. Iran and Venezuela were purposively selected as cases of Global South states that have, in recent decades, been engaged in sustained strategic confrontation with the prevailing hegemonic order. Within each case, the analysis focuses on the political networks surrounding Reza Pahlavi in Iran and María Corina Machado in Venezuela. The theoretical framework combines Southern Theory with the Gramscian concept of hegemony. As Raewyn Connell argues, Southern Theory challenges the uncritical universalization of concepts produced within the Global North and subsequently presented as universally applicable analytical tools. From this perspective, the analytical validity of political science concepts depends on their sensitivity to social context and structures of power. Within critical International Relations scholarship, hegemony is understood as a relatively durable form of political order reproduced through the interaction of material capabilities, institutions, and the production of meaning. Drawing on Gramsci, Robert Cox argues that a hegemonic order becomes consolidated when the interests of dominant powers are articulated as universal norms and incorporated into what is perceived as political common sense. To operationalize the distinction between endogenous opposition and opposition aligned with dominant powers, the study examines three dimensions: external institutional and financial ties; support for economic sanctions; and the acceptance or normalization of external political pressure and military intervention. Findings and Discussion The political network surrounding Reza Pahlavi in Iran. The analysis identifies extensive financial and institutional connections between actors within this network and Western political and governmental institutions, particularly in the United States and Israel. The Iran Revival group is openly aligned with Pahlavi's political agenda, while its leaders have made substantial financial contributions to Republican politicians in the United States. Pahlavi has also maintained close relations with hawkish think tanks in Washington. His public visit to Israel in April 2023 and meeting with Benjamin Netanyahu further illustrate his alignment with a major regional power. He has described economic sanctions as a legitimate means of weakening the Islamic Republic and supported the Trump administration's withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Following the U.S. assassination of General Qassem Soleimani, he characterized the action as a “positive development.” During the 2025 war, he likewise described Israeli attacks on Iran as a “historic opportunity” for regime change. The political network surrounding María Corina Machado in Venezuela. Machado's political ascent was accompanied from an early stage by material and institutional support from organizations aligned with U.S. foreign-policy interests. She was a co-founder of Súmate, which received financial support from the U.S. National Endowment for Democracy (NED), and was among those who signed the decree associated with the government formed during the 2002 coup attempt. Machado has also maintained close ties with the Atlas Network and was a guest of honor at the organization's Democracy Award ceremony in 2024. She has characterized international sanctions against Venezuela as a legitimate and necessary means of weakening the Maduro government. Since 2019, she has explicitly advocated activating a regional defense treaty as a basis for multinational military intervention against Maduro. In her communications with Netanyahu, she has also expressed support for Israeli policies during the Gaza war. Conclusion The comparative analysis of Iran and Venezuela suggests that certain opposition networks in the Global South may become aligned, through their political positions and external relationships, with mechanisms of pressure employed by dominant powers. Applying the three analytical indicators to the networks surrounding Reza Pahlavi and María Corina Machado reveals a significant degree of convergence, in the cases examined, between their political strategies and broader strategies of external pressure. This finding should not be interpreted as implying that these groups are directly controlled by foreign actors or that the same pattern applies to opposition movements throughout the Global South. Rather, it underscores the importance of examining opposition groups simultaneously in relation to their domestic social environment and the unequal structure of global power, while avoiding broad generalizations. Critically examining forms of opposition the Global South that become aligned with structures of domination does not entail denying the legitimacy of political dissent or justifying the conduct of incumbent governments. Rather, identifying the ways in which opposition groups may become aligned with global powers is essential to developing a more nuanced understanding of power, legitimacy, and political conflict in an unequal international order.

Abstract Introduction
Balance of power theory, once regarded as an “iron law” of international politics, faced serious explanatory challenges in the post-Cold War era. Yet China’s rapid rise over the past two decades (2009–2025) has once again placed the logic of balancing at the center of academic debate. The significance of this study lies in the transformation of international power dynamics since the Cold War. Today's balancing process, particularly in the context of U.S.-China strategic relations, has extended beyond conventional forms of internal and external balancing toward an active U.S. strategy aimed at disrupting the process of balancing against the dominant power. This study therefore adopts a dynamic and dialectical understanding of balancing and examines how the dominant power, the United States, uses diplomatic and strategic instruments to prolong its position of primacy and impede the emergence of effective balancing against it.
The central question of this study is how a dominant power can delay its decline and prolong its supremacy. Drawing on neoclassical realism and the concepts of “underbalancing” and “resource mobilization,” the study argues that the United States has disrupted the natural process of international balancing through a pattern of “hybrid and networked balancing.” This strategy, centered on the securitization of trade and technology, seeks to prevent the emergence of competing poles in the international system by moving beyond traditional alliances and toward new forms of multilateral connectivity.
Methodology
The study combines basic and applied research. It employs a case-study approach, focusing on U.S. efforts to disrupt the balancing process vis-à-vis China, complemented by a trend-analysis approach. A mixed-methods design within an empirical-analytical paradigm is used to achieve the research objectives, combining the use of existing data with in-depth analysis. The data and information analyzed in this study are drawn from a combination of library-based sources, both print and digital, as well as credible online sources.
The theoretical framework rests on four analytical levels. First, the study makes a fundamental distinction between “balancing as a structural condition” and “balancing as an intentional process,” a distinction that is essential for understanding U.S. behavior. Second, it draws on Stephen Walt’s balance of threat theory, according to which states respond to perceived threats rather than to power alone. Third, it incorporates key insights from neoclassical realism, particularly Randall Schweller’s concept of the “underbalancing” and Jeffrey Taliaferro’s concept of “resource mobilization.” Fourth, it draws on Kenneth Waltz’s argument concerning the suppression of rival balancing, according to which a dominant power can temporarily disrupt the process through which other states seek to balance against it.
By integrating these four analytical dimensions, the study develops a theoretical model of “suppressive balancing.” To examine this model empirically, it analyzes U.S.-China strategic competition across five presidential administrations: George W. Bush, Barack Obama, Donald Trump’s first administration, Joe Biden, and Donald Trump’s second administration.
Findings and Discussion
The findings indicate that between 2000 and 2025, the United States gradually moved beyond conventional balancing to deliberately disrupt the natural process of international balancing through a strategy of suppressive balancing. During the George W. Bush administration, this was evident in the U.S. withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, the strengthening of Taiwan’s military capabilities, and the restructuring of military alignments with India and Japan. Under Obama, the 2008 financial crisis and the costs of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan contributed to “underbalancing” in U.S. foreign policy. Rather than relying primarily on hard balancing, Obama pursued soft balancing through initiatives such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and efforts to promote norms in the South China Sea.
During Donald Trump’s first administration, U.S. policy shifted from neoclassical caution toward a more explicitly offensive realist orientation. China was identified as a “revisionist power” in the 2017 National Security Strategy. The trade war with China, sanctions and restrictions targeting Huawei, and the U.S. withdrawal from the TPP were among the major manifestations of U.S. efforts to disrupt the balancing process during this period. Under Biden, several of the measures introduced under Trump were institutionalized. Legislation such as the CHIPS and Science Act and the Inflation Reduction Act was adopted to mobilize domestic resources and strengthen internal balancing against China. At the same time, external balancing mechanisms that did not entail direct military confrontation were reinforced through arrangements such as AUKUS and the Quad.
During Trump’s second administration (2025–2026), aggressive tariff policies, controls on technology exports, and artificial-intelligence agreements in the Persian Gulf emerged as further examples of suppressive balancing in an era increasingly shaped by advanced technologies.
Overall, the findings suggest that by disrupting the natural process of balancing, the United States has been able to delay the emergence of China as a peer competitor. This strategy, however, is highly resource-intensive and is unlikely to remain sustainable over the long term. Structural pressures will ultimately push the international system toward bipolar balancing.
Conclusion
Moving beyond conventional realist approaches, this study introduces “suppressive balancing” as a third approach alongside internal and external balancing. Internal balancing involves strengthening a state’s power by expanding its domestic economic and military capabilities, whereas external balancing relies on alliances to distribute the costs of countering a rival. By contrast, a strategy of disrupting the balancing process seeks to preserve the dominant power’s position of primacy not primarily by increasing its own capabilities, but by constraining and weakening its rival through instruments such as technology controls, economic sanctions, and the securitization of trade. Although this can be effective in the short term, it requires substantial resources and is difficult to sustain over an extended period.
The empirical findings further suggest that 2025 and 2026 constitute a critical window for the United States. China’s military modernization, including the commissioning of the Fujian aircraft carrier and the expansion of its naval fleet to approximately 400 vessels, together with the emergence of China’s “Wolf Warrior” diplomacy, has reinforced perceptions of increasingly assertive intentions on the part of Beijing. From an offensive realist perspective, the United States is therefore compelled to prevent further growth in Chinese power during this critical period. At the same time, however, the deep economic interdependence between the two countries and the enormous costs of complete economic decoupling constrain the prospects for comprehensive confrontation.
Ultimately, drawing on Waltz’s prediction, the study identifies the emergence of a bipolar international system as the most likely future trajectory of the international order. Unlike the Cold War, however, this new bipolarity is unlikely to reproduce the same fundamental ideological conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States, partly because China has embraced the capitalist economic system. Moreover, the weakening of a sense of “we-ness” among U.S. allies, together with intermittent isolationist tendencies in U.S. foreign policy, has complicated Washington’s ability to balance China effectively. Thus, although the strategy of disrupting the balancing process may prove effective in the short term, its long-term viability will be constrained by structural, financial, and alliance-related limitations.

Abstract Introduction The 2015 migration crisis marked a turning point in European Union policymaking, as migration gradually came to be framed not merely as a humanitarian issue but also as a matter with significant security implications. Within this context, the migration of Afghan nationals assumed particular importance in EU migration policy, given the persistence of political instability and the intensification of displacement in Afghanistan, particularly following the Taliban’s return to power in 2021. Despite the significance of this issue, much of the existing literature has focused on the legal, statistical, and administrative dimensions of migration, while comparatively little attention has been devoted to the discursive representation of Afghan migrants in European political and media discourse. Discourse analysis is particularly important because dominant representations of migration are not simply descriptive. They actively contribute to legitimizing policies, shaping institutional priorities, allocating resources, and structuring policy practices. The central research question is: How has Afghan migration been represented in the political and media discourse of the European Union, and what role have these representations played in shaping EU migration policies? The article argues that Afghan migration has largely been represented through a multilayered process of securitization in which security-oriented, technocratic, and humanitarian rationalities operate simultaneously. Methodology The study adopts an analytical-critical approach based on the Copenhagen School’s theory of securitization and Norman Fairclough’s three-dimensional model of critical discourse analysis, which examines discourse at the textual, discursive, and social levels. In contrast to state-centric approaches, the Copenhagen School conceptualizes security not as an objective condition but as a discursive and intersubjective phenomenon produced through linguistic and political interactions. The concept of securitization, developed by Ole Wæver, refers to the process through which issues that would ordinarily be addressed through routine political processes are constructed as matters of existential urgency. Through this process, an issue is represented discursively as a threat to survival, thereby legitimizing the adoption of extraordinary measures. The empirical data consist of three main categories: official EU documents, including European Commission communications, statements, and policy frameworks; reports issued by the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex), the EU agency responsible for supporting border management and security; and selected media texts from The Guardian, POLITICO Europe, and Kathimerini. The analysis covers the period from 2015 to 2025. Approximately 80 institutional and media texts were analyzed using NVivo through a combination of theory-driven and data-driven coding. The resulting concepts were organized into three principal conceptual clusters: securitization, rights-based discourse, and technocratic discourse. Findings and Discussion The findings indicate that EU migration policy toward Afghan migrants has been shaped by three major discursive patterns. Securitization Discourse Following the 2015 migration crisis, EU migration policymaking was reconfigured in ways that increasingly framed migration through security and managerial lenses. The use of terms such as “crisis,” “influx,” and “illegal crossing” in official discourse contributed to shifting migration from the domain of routine policymaking into a sphere of urgency. In Frontex reports, Afghan migration, alongside migration from Syria and the Sahel region, is represented as a challenge to the effective functioning of the EU’s border-management system. Terms such as “threat,” “disorder,” “smuggling,” and “migratory pressure” also recur frequently in these reports. The Threat-Victim Dichotomy EU migration policies toward Afghan migrants have been articulated within a persistent tension between rights-based and security-oriented discourses. While official documents emphasize the EU’s moral responsibility and its commitment to protecting asylum seekers, migration is simultaneously represented as a potential source of social instability and a challenge to domestic order. This dual representation serves an important political function. Representing migrants as victims allows the EU to preserve its commitment to human rights and humanitarian values, while their simultaneous representation as potential threats reinforces the legitimacy of restrictive and control-oriented migration policies. Technocratic and Bureaucratic Discourse Alongside these securitizing processes, another layer of discourse has emerged that is predominantly technical, managerial, and bureaucratic in character. Within this framework, migration is treated primarily as an operational and data-driven policy problem, while concepts such as “risk management,” “security screening,” and “surveillance systems” have become increasingly prominent in the policy lexicon. The substantial increase in Frontex’s budget, from €535 million in 2021 to €845 million in 2023, provides a clear indication of the institutional and structural consolidation of this discourse. In contrast, a rights-based and humanitarian discourse, articulated by civil society organizations such as the European Council on Refugees and Exiles (ECRE) and Amnesty International, as well as by liberal media outlets such as The Guardian, emphasizes human dignity, humanitarian protection, and moral responsibility. These narratives, however, have generally remained peripheral to the dominant policy discourse, although at certain critical junctures they have influenced official decision-making. For example, the Afghanistan Country Guidance issued by the European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA) in 2024, drawing on evidence of widespread repression in Afghanistan, recognized the need for international protection for a broad range of Afghan asylum seekers. Conclusion The study demonstrates that, between 2015 and 2025, security-oriented discourse played a decisive role in shaping EU migration policies toward Afghan migrants. Discursive representations did not merely describe migration; they actively contributed to making particular policy responses possible and to legitimizing them. The construction of Afghan migration as a security threat helped create the political and institutional conditions for increased funding and expanded powers for Frontex, more extensive security screening procedures, and the institutionalization of return policies. The study’s principal theoretical contribution lies in proposing a three-layer typology of the securitization of Afghan migration: classical institutional securitization, technocratic-bureaucratic securitization, and conditional humanitarian securitization. This typology challenges a common assumption in the securitization literature that securitization necessarily occurs through an explicit speech act and the declaration of a state of exception. The findings suggest that, in contemporary EU migration policy, securitization can also become embedded through the normalized language of policymaking, the bureaucratization of decision-making, and the simultaneous operation of security and humanitarian rationalities. Methodologically, the combination of the Copenhagen School’s securitization theory with Fairclough’s model of critical discourse analysis demonstrates that the securitization of Afghan migrants is not solely the outcome of explicit political decisions. Rather, it can gradually become institutionalized through normalized policy language, bureaucratic practices, and media representations. The findings also offer practical guidance for migration policymaking in Iran, one of the principal host countries for Afghan migrants. They suggest that an exclusively security-oriented approach, although potentially effective in strengthening administrative controls in the short term, may in the longer term contribute to greater social marginalization and make migration governance more complex and difficult.