Strategic Studies Quarterly

Abstract Introduction
Political parties and electoral systems are among the core institutions that shape governance and political development. They play a central role in political socialization, elite organization, public participation, and the overall policy-making process. By creating policy discourses and linking political elites with the wider public, parties can foster policy learning, strengthen the rationality of governance, and contribute to the formation of coherent national visions. In contrast, electoral systems, as mechanisms for power circulation and legitimacy renewal, enable fair competition and the presentation of alternative governance ideas.
Despite the presence of formal party and electoral structures in Iran, weak institutionalization, populist tendencies, lack of organizational cohesion, absence of party culture, and unstable electoral laws have prevented political parties from becoming effective actors in policy-making and national planning. The study asks why Iranian political parties have failed to act as learning and mediating institutions that generate sustainable, vision-driven policies, and what structural obstacles have constrained their performance.
A historical overview of Iranian parties shows that since the early post-revolution years, their capacity for discourse formation and doctrine development has steadily declined. Short-term electoral rivalries and populist slogans have replaced long-term policy thinking. This shift has widened the gap between policy-making institutions and society, weakening representation, policy accumulation, and the creation of shared national visions. The paper therefore argues that reforming Iran’s party and electoral systems is a prerequisite for better governance and more effective national policy-making.
 
Methodology
This study adopts a qualitative, descriptive–analytical approach based on documentary and library research. It reviews theoretical sources, legal documents, and comparative experiences to assess the role of political parties in designing and guiding policy processes. The research is exploratory rather than hypothesis-testing.
The theoretical framework rests on three interrelated components—political discourse formation, political marketing, and policy accumulation—which together form a “functional triangle of political parties.” This model explains how parties can promote national visions by creating and communicating policy discourses, marketing their programs within electoral systems, and ensuring continuity in pursuing long-term policies. The concept of policy entrepreneurship is also used to highlight the innovative role of parties in developing and implementing governance ideas.
Data were analyzed through two main steps: (1) tracing the historical and discursive evolution of parties in Iran from the 1970s onward, and (2) comparing party and electoral systems in countries that have successfully maintained coherent national visions. Using institutional and comparative analysis, the study identifies the main sources of dysfunction in Iran’s party system and proposes directions for reform.
 
Findings and Discussion
In developed political systems, parties act as key intermediaries and learning organizations that drive the formulation and implementation of stable policies. In Iran, however, weak institutional foundations and insufficient accumulative infrastructure have undermined such a role. Iranian parties face serious limitations in all three functional areas: discourse formation, political marketing, and policy accumulation.
In discourse formation, personality-based politics, lack of policy training, and weak connections between intellectual elites and party organizations have prevented the generation of lasting governance ideas. In political marketing, elections are dominated by broad, populist slogans rather than evidence-based programs. In policy accumulation, the absence of continuity and coherence in pursuing policies has blocked learning cycles and the systematic transfer of experience in national policy-making.
The country’s legal and institutional frameworks also fail to support party development. The lack of a comprehensive party law, weak financial oversight, poor linkages between parties and parliament, and overreliance on individual politicians have reduced parties to temporary electoral vehicles rather than stable policy institutions. Declining public trust and legitimacy have further weakened the organic connection between society and elites, eroding parties’ ability to inspire hope and articulate shared futures.
Comparative evidence from Germany, India, and China indicates that idea-driven, coherent, and consultative party systems—characterized by sustained interaction between parties and the state—are most capable of producing vision-driven policies. Fragmented systems lacking institutional accumulation, by contrast, struggle to build stable national visions. In Iran, the weakness of political parties not only hampers participatory policy-making but also diminishes the nation’s “political capital of hope.”
 
Conclusion
The analysis shows that Iranian political parties, constrained by structural weaknesses, inadequate legislation, personality-centered politics, and short-term electoral goals, have been unable to contribute effectively to policy-making or the shaping of national vision. As a result, the policy process has become fragmented, reactive, and largely detached from long-term learning and participation.
Revitalizing the role of parties requires action in three areas:
1.         Institutionalizing party culture through civic and political education;
2.         Reforming the electoral system to enhance transparency, competition, and accountability; and
3.         Strengthening the legal and institutional status of parties within the governance framework.
Parties must also reclaim their capacity to generate vision-driven policies grounded in national discourses and collective rationality. Continuous interaction among policy-makers, academics, and civil society can raise the quality of policy-making and rebuild political hope. Ultimately, without a restructured party and electoral system, effective governance, sustainable development, and a coherent national future will remain out of reach. Political parties can become genuine producers of national vision only when they move beyond short-term electoral competition and act as central actors in learning, decision-making, and the creation of development-oriented policy discourses.
 

Abstract Introduction
Degraded urban areas in Iran—particularly in Tehran—represent some of the most complex urban challenges. These neighborhoods are marked by physical decay, poor infrastructure, overcrowding, and fragmented spatial organization, which have led to declining living standards and rising social problems.
The Harandi neighborhood in Tehran’s District 12 exemplifies this condition. Despite its historical background and central location, Harandi has undergone significant physical and social decline over recent decades and is now considered one of the most insecure areas in the city. Narrow alleys, irregular street patterns, poor lighting, abandoned buildings, and neglected open spaces—combined with concentrated social issues—have made the neighborhood feel unsafe, especially for women who tend to be more sensitive to environmental cues.
Women living in or passing through Harandi often encounter spaces that lack visibility, environmental control, and a sense of comfort. This reduces their willingness to be present in public areas, reinforcing both spatial self-restriction and gender inequality. Despite repeated urban regeneration initiatives, the role of physical design in shaping women’s perceptions of safety has received little systematic attention.
This study takes Harandi as a case study to examine how physical and environmental features—such as lighting, pathway connectivity, visibility, land-use diversity, and maintenance—affect women’s sustainable sense of safety in public urban spaces.
 
Methodology
The study adopts a quantitative, field-based approach to explore how environmental qualities influence women’s perceived safety in one of Tehran’s degraded urban areas. Because the research focuses on women’s lived experiences and environmental perceptions, direct data collection from residents was essential.
A survey method using a structured questionnaire was employed. The study population included women residing in Harandi (District 12). According to official data, the neighborhood’s population is about 32,145, of which 12,647 are women. Women aged 18 and older formed the target group. Using the Cochran formula (95% confidence level, 5% margin of error), a sample of 367 participants was determined. Respondents were selected through stratified random sampling to ensure diversity in age and spatial distribution.
The questionnaire was developed based on theories in urban safety, environmental psychology, and urban design. It included items measuring lighting quality, street connectivity, visibility, land-use patterns, street furniture, maintenance, and perceived safety—rated on a five-point Likert scale from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree.” After pilot testing and expert review, the instrument’s reliability was confirmed with a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.865, indicating high internal consistency.
Data analysis included descriptive statistics followed by structural equation modeling (SEM) using SmartPLS software. Model validity was tested through convergent and discriminant validity measures and path coefficients. The results provided a clear and evidence-based understanding of the current situation and helped identify design strategies to improve environmental quality and women’s sense of safety in degraded urban areas.
 
Findings and Discussion
The analysis shows that in degraded neighborhoods like Harandi, women’s sustainable safety results from the interaction of physical, functional, and perceptual factors. The most influential dimension was movement structure and accessibility (total effect = 0.49), demonstrating that organized, legible pathways strongly shape women’s feelings of safety.
Lighting quality ranked second (effect = 0.38). Sufficient, uniform lighting at night not only improves visibility but also signals social presence and informal surveillance, reducing the likelihood of “blind spots.”
Psychological safety ranked third (effect = 0.35), highlighting the importance of mental comfort, sense of control, and collective memory in shaping women’s perception of safety. Environmental maintenance (effect = 0.32) showed that cleanliness and well-kept surfaces are seen as indicators of active urban management and monitoring. Active land uses (effect = 0.29) enhance security by ensuring continuous presence and economic vitality. Street furniture (effect = 0.26) contributes indirectly to safety by increasing comfort and usability. Natural surveillance (effect = 0.24) and spatial legibility (effect = 0.20) also reduce anxiety through visibility and predictability.
The components ranked as follows:

Pathways and accessibility
Lighting
Psychological safety
Environmental maintenance
Active land uses
Street furniture
Natural surveillance
Spatial legibility

 
Conclusion
The study concludes that women’s sense of safety in degraded urban areas is a multifaceted phenomenon closely tied to environmental design quality. In Harandi, insecurity is not solely the result of social problems but also of physical decay, poor lighting, spatial fragmentation, and visual disorder.
The structural model shows that organized street networks and accessible routes play the most important role in creating sustainable safety. Predictable, connected, and visible spaces give women a stronger sense of control and comfort. Consistent and effective lighting—as a sign of supervision and social presence—was the second key factor. Psychological aspects, such as feelings of comfort and support, also contribute greatly to women’s willingness to be present and active in public spaces.
Conversely, poor maintenance, neglected spaces, and unsafe street furniture erode trust and increase anxiety. Overall, the findings emphasize that improving women’s safety in degraded urban fabrics cannot rely solely on policing or surveillance. A holistic approach that integrates physical, environmental, and perceptual dimensions is essential.
Sustainable safety is achieved when women can read and navigate their environment, feel visible, and recognize their presence as an integral part of the neighborhood’s social life.

Abstract  
 
Introduction
The southern parts of Kerman Province represent a strategically important and semi-border area that faces long-standing security challenges. Its proximity to Afghanistan and Pakistan, along with its considerable distance from the provincial capital, has contributed to persistent instability. The roots of insecurity in this region lie largely in internal issues—such as weak local governance, the center–periphery divide, the spread of illegal networks, and the dominance of the shadow economy—rather than in purely external threats.
Therefore, security in southern Kerman is multidimensional and deeply interconnected, where political, military, social, and economic factors overlap and cannot easily be separated.
 
Methodology
This study adopts a qualitative and structural approach within a systemic analytical framework. The MICMAC method (Cross-Impact Matrix Multiplication Applied to Classification) was used to identify key variables and map their interrelations.
The research sample included 50 local elites, such as governors, judges, journalists, and social–political activists. Participants were selected through purposeful sampling and theoretical saturation to ensure comprehensive and reliable data.
 
Findings and Discussion
1. Driving Variables

The penetration of local political groups into the informal and smuggling-based economy
The instrumental use of local forces within smuggling-related security structures
The normalization of violence due to the widespread use of illegal weapons
The interaction of military personnel with organized crime networks
The outmigration of elites and recruitment of youth into informal groups

2. Dependent Variables

High sensitivity to national security reforms and policies
The dual and sometimes conflicting roles of military and police forces
The significant influence of tribal leaders and ethnic elites in local governance

3. Independent Variables

Lack of strong local political parties and legal channels for participation
Public distrust toward security and judicial institutions
Limited political awareness among local elites

4. Regulatory Variables

Weak representation at the national political level
Elections used as tools to legitimize corrupt structures
Ethnic grievances and structural discrimination
Unequal distribution of political and security resources

 
Conclusion
Reforming the political–military security structure in southern Kerman requires comprehensive change across political, security, social and cultural dimensions. Sustainable stability depends on institutional coherence and transparency, active participation of citizens and local elites, rebuilding judicial and security institutions, and reducing the influence of informal networks and black-market economies.
MICMAC analysis reveals that the region’s security system is structurally unstable, characterized by complex, nonlinear relationships among variables. This instability is marked by:

Multidirectional and intersecting linkages—for example, between smuggling networks, political institutions, and security corruption—that defy linear policy solutions.
High centralization and interdependence—changes in one variable can trigger unpredictable chain reactions across the system.
Absence of stabilizing variables, making reform efforts difficult and requiring a holistic, system-wide approach.

According to MICMAC rankings, the three most influential drivers of instability are:

Penetration of local political actors into smuggling networks (Score: 490) – linking formal institutions with fuel and drug trafficking mafias, forming the nucleus of systemic corruption.
Instrumental use of local security forces by smuggling groups (Score: 459) – transforming local actors into enforcers of informal order, eroding social cohesion.
Normalization of violence and proliferation of illegal arms (Score: 440) – embedding violence into daily life and creating a culture of fear that undermines human security.

The most vulnerable dependent variables under these unstable conditions are:

Infiltration of official intelligence systems by corruption (Score: 477)
Dual and conflicting roles of security and military forces (Score: 440)
Mismatch between national security policy and border realities (Score: 428) – particularly due to the influx of undocumented migrants from the eastern borders.

Overall, these findings point to a systemic failure of formal institutions to fulfill their core functions, leaving southern Kerman exposed to threats from informal networks and illegal cross-border activities.

Abstract Introduction
The issue of dual citizenship remains one of the main policy challenges in the Islamic Republic of Iran. This is largely due to the absence of a comprehensive and strategic approach, as well as differing governmental views on the subject. In contrast, many other countries have developed practical policies to manage the legal, political, and social dimensions of dual nationality.
This study examines the experiences of selected countries and evaluates their approaches to dual citizenship through the lens of national power. The central question is: “What lessons can Iran learn from other countries’ approaches to dual citizenship to improve its policymaking?”
The main hypothesis proposes that, while some countries still reject dual citizenship as a threat to their national power, many others have adopted a more pragmatic and positive view. These countries have reformed domestic laws and used international legal frameworks to minimize potential risks while turning dual citizens into a strategic asset for strengthening their national power.
 
Methodology
Where traditional perspectives tend to treat nationality and dual nationality in rigid legal or political terms, this study adopts a modern and qualitative approach. Using library-based research—including books, scholarly articles, and legal documents—it traces the evolution of attitudes toward nationality and dual nationality within the broader concept of national power, understood as the combination of a nation’s material and immaterial capabilities within its political and geographic boundaries.
 
Findings and Discussion
A review of global perspectives reveals a broad range of attitudes toward dual citizenship, from restrictive to permissive. Some countries, including China, Russia, and Japan, do not permit dual citizenship for their nationals, emphasizing the decisive role of population in national power. These countries often impose penalties, such as banning dual nationals from holding government positions.
In contrast, some countries argue that population size is no longer the primary determinant of power or security in the modern world. Consequently, they impose no restrictions on their citizens acquiring foreign citizenship. Indeed, global shifts in power structures, the expansion of digital communication that transcends borders, and the growing competition for human and financial capital have all prompted many states to reconsider their policies.
Today, many countries have adopted a more open approach to dual citizenship. On the one hand, they now recognize it for their citizens and have even amended domestic laws to facilitate this process. On the other hand, they have created internal legal frameworks and drawn upon international legal mechanisms to prevent potential political and legal complications arising from dual citizens. Recognizing the individual right to hold dual nationality, revising laws to ease travel and investment for dual citizens, and allocating parliamentary seats to citizens living abroad—many of whom hold dual nationality—are among the measures taken by countries with a balanced and pragmatic stance toward this phenomenon. At the same time, in terms of legal deterrence, these countries have sought to rely on internationally accepted doctrines and principles—such as the principle of state non-responsibility, the rule of primary nationality, and the theory of effective nationality—to manage potential political and legal challenges posed by dual citizens.
In Iran’s case, despite having between five and eight million citizens living abroad—many of whom are dual nationals—the country still lacks a unified policy on the issue. Although recent initiatives have taken a more moderate stance, inconsistencies remain. For instance, Iranian law prohibits dual nationals from public employment but allows them to serve as advisors, creating legal ambiguity and policy inefficiency.
Nevertheless, Iran’s recent approach signals a gradual shift toward engaging Iranians abroad as part of its broader strategy to enhance national power. Given that power today encompasses economic, cultural, and social dimensions—not only military and political ones—the Iranian diaspora can play a constructive role in countering anti-Iran sentiment and promoting international cooperation.
 
Conclusion
Dual citizenship has become a global phenomenon affecting nearly every country. States can broadly be divided into two categories: those that perceive it as a national threat (negative view) and those that see it as an opportunity (positive view). In Iran, although a negative attitude has long dominated, policymakers have increasingly recognized the need for reform. Recent years show a slow but clear movement toward acceptance and engagement with dual nationals as potential contributors to national development and diplomacy. Thus, while security concerns persist, the prevailing trend in Iran is shifting toward a more balanced and constructive view of dual citizenship as part of its national power.
Given these considerations, it is evident that formulating a coherent and strategic policy to address the issue of dual-national Iranians requires drawing upon the experiences of other countries. As the study findings indicate, although some nations—similar to the prevailing perspective in Iran—still view dual citizens as a potential threat to national cohesion and power, many others have recognized dual citizenship as a global reality. By moving beyond a purely negative or positive perception and adopting strategic policies aimed at maximizing engagement within a secure framework, these countries have managed to transform the challenges into a political, economic, and social opportunity both domestically and internationally.
In this regard, to address the question of dual-national Iranians while safeguarding national interests, Iran could initially follow the example of countries that regard dual citizenship as a personal matter, and subsequently establish mechanisms for mutual interaction between the government and dual citizens, paving the way for a comprehensive resolution of this issue.
 

Abstract Introduction
Discussions of security have evolved along two main paths in the United States and Europe.
American scholars have generally adopted a problem-solving approach, developing theories within the frameworks of offensive and defensive realism, constructivism, and debates over the relative roles of power and institutions in maintaining order.
In contrast, Europeans—drawing on critical theory and emancipatory thought—have explored security through the lenses of critical security studies, feminism, the Copenhagen School, the Paris School, and post-structuralism.
In short, one tradition seeks to achieve security and prevent conflict within the existing international framework, while the other views that very framework as a source of insecurity and instability.
Since the 1980s, the growing influence of constructivist interpretations has helped bridge this divide. In this view, security is seen as distinct from both peace and power, and is understood as a relational concept that evolves through social interaction. Anarchy is conceived as a spectrum that must pass through its stages—from infancy to maturity and old age. Security, likewise, is understood as a relational discourse situated between the discourse of pure power and that of authentic social engagement.
Building on this theoretical foundation, this study examines the security structure of West Asia, which is marked by exclusivity, volatility, institutional fragility, and a tendency toward violence. It argues that the region remains trapped in a state of immature anarchy, where competition, mistrust and security dilemmas dominate and structural underdevelopment prevents the establishment of lasting peace.
This analysis is guided by two main questions:

What factors explain the persistence of this immature security structure?
How might it evolve toward a more mature and stable order?

The study adopts the view that security structures are not purely material or power-based but are also social constructs—shaped by shared knowledge, norms, and interactions. Accordingly, the regional order in West Asia results from both the distribution of power and patterns of social relations among its main actors.
 
Methodology
Questions such as “What is security?”, “How can it be achieved?”, and “At what level should it be constructed?” have produced a wide range of theoretical answers—from realism to critical theory. Similarly, debates over whether competition or cooperation dominates the international system—and over what constitutes the security referent object, security agent, and security model—have given rise to competing paradigms.
This study adopts a hybrid and integrative approach that seeks to bridge these divides. For this, it introduces a new conceptual framework—the Critical Non-Democratic Peace Model—based on the idea that the international system has shifted from a distributive to a multiplicative structure. In such a system, traditional theoretical frameworks are no longer sufficient to explain evolving dynamics. Therefore, we must either develop new theoretical perspectives or combine existing ones to capture this complexity.
To this end, the paper integrates insights from four major traditions:

Democratic Peace Theory
Holistic Constructivism
Critical Theory
Structural Realism

A mixed-method approach, combining qualitative and quantitative methods and relying on both library and online resources, is used to support the analysis.
 
Findings and Discussion
A central question in security studies has long been how peace emerges and under what conditions it can be sustained. In the context of West Asia, this question becomes even more pressing: Why has peace remained elusive in this region? Are the sources of instability internal, structural, or both? Does the absence of democratic governance explain the recurring conflicts—or is democracy itself irrelevant to regional security?
Drawing on the Critical Non-Democratic Peace Theory, this study argues that the key obstacle to stability in West Asia is the absence of a shared understanding of balance among the region’s main powers. Sustainable peace, therefore, does not depend primarily on a state’s political system—democratic or otherwise—but rather on whether regional actors can reach a mutual conception of equilibrium in their relations.
 
Conclusion
This research challenges the assumptions of Democratic Peace Theory, which holds that peace is achievable only among democratic states. The findings show that the four major powers in West Asia—Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Israel—each operate according to different logics of balance:

Iran: Balance of identity
Turkey: Balance of interests
Israel: Balance of threat
Saudi Arabia: Balance of power

Because these actors lack a common understanding of balance, their interactions are marked by persistent misperceptions, mistrust, and conflict.
The study further distinguishes between different types of peace:

A balance of power produces a fragile, fear-based peace.
A balance of interests leads to a more stable, institutionalized peace built on mutual benefits and interests.
A balance of threat or identity generates a normatively grounded peace—though the former is civic and democratic, while the latter tends to be ideological or sectarian.

Ultimately, the paper concludes that peace is not exclusive to democratic systems. Even non-democratic regions such as West Asia can achieve peace—provided that their leading states develop a shared sense of balance, regardless of the specific form that balance takes.
 

Abstract  
Introduction
With the rapid expansion of artificial intelligence (AI) systems across public and private sectors, coordinated governance and purposeful stakeholder engagement have become essential. This study introduces a compact framework that combines SWOT analysis with stakeholder prioritization to support transparent, effective, and sustainable AI governance.
Methodology
The research follows three main steps: (1) Identifying internal and external drivers of AI governance through SWOT analysis; (2) Recognizing key stakeholders—including regulators, technology companies, research institutions, civil society organizations, and end users—and assessing them according to five criteria: influence, importance, financial capacity, technical expertise, and legitimacy; (3) Quantifying expert survey responses and applying the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) to weight the criteria and rank the stakeholders. The outcomes include priority matrices and comparative tables.
Findings and Discussion
The AHP results show that governments/regulators and technology companies rank highest due to their legal authority, resources, and technical capabilities. Research institutions and civil society organizations occupy a middle tier—they play a key role in legitimacy and oversight but often face limited resources. End users have less influence in setting agendas but are crucial for ensuring fairness, safety, and accountability. The SWOT analysis reveals key strengths (growing institutional awareness), weaknesses (fragmented missions, uneven literacy), opportunities (standardization, public–private partnerships), and threats (regulatory disputes, concentration of capabilities). Aligning powerful actors with those that strengthen legitimacy can reduce institutional capture and promote responsible AI adoption.
Conclusion
The proposed framework offers a practical tool for organizing stakeholder interactions, defining roles, and tracking governance maturity. Cross-sector collaboration—especially between regulators and technology companies—should be supported by structured mechanisms for including input from research institutions, civil society, and end users. Future studies can test alternative evaluation criteria and explore cross-national case examples.