Keywords = Balance of Power
Number of Articles: 6
America and Interventionism in the International Balancing Process 2000-2025

America and Interventionism in the International Balancing Process 2000-2025

Articles in Press, Accepted Manuscript, Available Online from 05 August 2026

https://doi.org/10.22034/ssq.2026.573663.4363

Gholamali Chegnizadeh

Abstract Balance of power theory, once regarded as the “iron law” of international politics, encountered serious explanatory challenges in the post–Cold War era. However, China’s rapid rise over the past two decades has once again brought the logic of balancing to the center of academic debate. Nevertheless, the principal balance of power in the contemporary international system—between the United States and a rising China—has moved beyond traditional patterns of balancing toward an active strategy that can be described as the “disruption of the balancing process.” Accordingly, this study distinguishes between “balancing as an automatic structural outcome” and “balance-making as an intentional, agent-driven process” in order to address the following question: how can a dominant power delay this outcome and render its position of superiority more durable? Drawing on neoclassical realist insights and integrating the concepts of “underbalancing” and “resource mobilization,” the study argues that the United States has disrupted the natural process of international balancing through a model of “hybrid and networked balance-making.” This interventionist strategy, grounded in the securitization of trade and technology, seeks to prevent the emergence of rival poles in the global order by moving beyond traditional alliances toward new forms of multilateral linkages. It should be noted that this research adopts a fundamental–developmental orientation and employs a case study (U.S. balancing disruption vis-à-vis China) alongside process tracing. To achieve its objectives, the study utilizes a mixed-methods approach within a scientific-empirical paradigm, enabling both systematic data usage and analytical interpretation.

A Model of Non-Democratic Peace and the Security Structure in West Asia

A Model of Non-Democratic Peace and the Security Structure in West Asia

Volume 28, Issue 2, Autumn 2025

https://doi.org/10.22034/ssq.2025.523702.4277

Siamak Bahrami

Abstract Introduction
Discussions of security have evolved along two main paths in the United States and Europe.
American scholars have generally adopted a problem-solving approach, developing theories within the frameworks of offensive and defensive realism, constructivism, and debates over the relative roles of power and institutions in maintaining order.

In contrast, Europeans—drawing on critical theory and emancipatory thought—have explored security through the lenses of critical security studies, feminism, the Copenhagen School, the Paris School, and post-structuralism.
In short, one tradition seeks to achieve security and prevent conflict within the existing international framework, while the other views that very framework as a source of insecurity and instability.
Since the 1980s, the growing influence of constructivist interpretations has helped bridge this divide. In this view, security is seen as distinct from both peace and power, and is understood as a relational concept that evolves through social interaction. Anarchy is conceived as a spectrum that must pass through its stages—from infancy to maturity and old age. Security, likewise, is understood as a relational discourse situated between the discourse of pure power and that of authentic social engagement.
Building on this theoretical foundation, this study examines the security structure of West Asia, which is marked by exclusivity, volatility, institutional fragility, and a tendency toward violence. It argues that the region remains trapped in a state of immature anarchy, where competition, mistrust and security dilemmas dominate and structural underdevelopment prevents the establishment of lasting peace.
This analysis is guided by two main questions:

What factors explain the persistence of this immature security structure?
How might it evolve toward a more mature and stable order?

The study adopts the view that security structures are not purely material or power-based but are also social constructs—shaped by shared knowledge, norms, and interactions. Accordingly, the regional order in West Asia results from both the distribution of power and patterns of social relations among its main actors.
 
Methodology
Questions such as “What is security?”, “How can it be achieved?”, and “At what level should it be constructed?” have produced a wide range of theoretical answers—from realism to critical theory. Similarly, debates over whether competition or cooperation dominates the international system—and over what constitutes the security referent object, security agent, and security model—have given rise to competing paradigms.
This study adopts a hybrid and integrative approach that seeks to bridge these divides. For this, it introduces a new conceptual framework—the Critical Non-Democratic Peace Model—based on the idea that the international system has shifted from a distributive to a multiplicative structure. In such a system, traditional theoretical frameworks are no longer sufficient to explain evolving dynamics. Therefore, we must either develop new theoretical perspectives or combine existing ones to capture this complexity.
To this end, the paper integrates insights from four major traditions:

Democratic Peace Theory
Holistic Constructivism
Critical Theory
Structural Realism

A mixed-method approach, combining qualitative and quantitative methods and relying on both library and online resources, is used to support the analysis.
 
Findings and Discussion
A central question in security studies has long been how peace emerges and under what conditions it can be sustained. In the context of West Asia, this question becomes even more pressing: Why has peace remained elusive in this region? Are the sources of instability internal, structural, or both? Does the absence of democratic governance explain the recurring conflicts—or is democracy itself irrelevant to regional security?
Drawing on the Critical Non-Democratic Peace Theory, this study argues that the key obstacle to stability in West Asia is the absence of a shared understanding of balance among the region’s main powers. Sustainable peace, therefore, does not depend primarily on a state’s political system—democratic or otherwise—but rather on whether regional actors can reach a mutual conception of equilibrium in their relations.
 
Conclusion
This research challenges the assumptions of Democratic Peace Theory, which holds that peace is achievable only among democratic states. The findings show that the four major powers in West Asia—Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Israel—each operate according to different logics of balance:

Iran: Balance of identity
Turkey: Balance of interests
Israel: Balance of threat
Saudi Arabia: Balance of power

Because these actors lack a common understanding of balance, their interactions are marked by persistent misperceptions, mistrust, and conflict.
The study further distinguishes between different types of peace:

A balance of power produces a fragile, fear-based peace.
A balance of interests leads to a more stable, institutionalized peace built on mutual benefits and interests.
A balance of threat or identity generates a normatively grounded peace—though the former is civic and democratic, while the latter tends to be ideological or sectarian.

Ultimately, the paper concludes that peace is not exclusive to democratic systems. Even non-democratic regions such as West Asia can achieve peace—provided that their leading states develop a shared sense of balance, regardless of the specific form that balance takes.
 

Regime Security and the Logic of Alliances in the Middle East

Regime Security and the Logic of Alliances in the Middle East

Volume 23, Issue 3, Autumn 2021, Pages 105-132

Vali Golmohammadi

Abstract This article seeks to systematically survey the logic of unstable alliances in the Middle East after the Arab revolutions. On what basis do the governments of the Middle East enter into alliances with each other and what variables influence their fluid-forming coalition behavior? Contrary to mainstream approaches to explaining the nature of alliances, variables such as balance of power, anarchy, identity, and external threats alone are unable to understand the empirical mechanisms and complexities of Middle Eastern governments' unifying behavior. Using theories of alliance in international relations, the present paper proposes an integrated framework of "regime security" as an alternative approach to survey the roots of alliance in the Middle East. Despite the changes in the international and regional environment, the main interests of each of the Middle Eastern governments are still to ensure the survival and security of their political regime. Indeed, the foreign relations and alliance options of Middle Eastern governments are based on their dynamic action to secure the ruling regime in the face of potential internal and external threats. Under such circumstances, alliances are formulated as transnational coalitions between potential allies to ensure the survival of political regimes. For test of the main idea of the article, case studies of regional alliances in the Middle East is discussed.

Irans Foreign Policy Strategy for Regional Balance of Power

Iran's Foreign Policy Strategy for Regional Balance of Power

Volume 21, Issue 82, Winter 2019, Pages 183-206

Keyhan Barzegar

Abstract Regional developments, particularly after the Arab Spring, emergence of new crises including in Syria and Iraq, the rise of Daesh terrorists, the weakening of governments, and subsequent redefinition of the roles of regional and extra-regional actors to fill the power vacuum have rendered the need to devise a new strategy in Iran's foreign policy inevitable—a strategy that is capable of adapting to a rapidly changing environment in the region. The main assumption of this article is that the two principles of strengthening "regional cooperation" and "deterring threats from the region" (in terms of both soft and hard warfare) should be kept in balance under the new circumstances so that Iran's status can be maintained in the regional balance of power. Accordingly, the author believes that the need to gradually combine the two existing foreign policy strategies and to introduce a third strategy—referred to here as "a strong from inside Iran"—is inevitable.
 
 

Methodological implications of Neo - Realism

Methodological implications of Neo - Realism

Volume 10, Issue 36, Summer 2007, Pages 215-238

Qadir Nasri

Abstract We witnessed a new school in international politics so called neo-realism after Hans Morgenthau's dead in July 1980. Kenneth Waltz – the notably scientist in IR – made some adjustments in realism produced by Morgenthau for analyzing international order and disorder in his The Theory of International Politics. In the paper could be found the differentiations between Realism and Neo- Realism in concerned with Waltz's book, so it needs to respond what is the cognitive manner and international security analyses in Neo-Realism? With the reviewing the adjustments and the presuppositions and the key concepts of Neo- Realism it is make popper condition for focus on four main ideas of it. Rethinking the essential suppositions of realism by Neo-realism, the author argues; make proper explanation in international security for regarding to dynamic nature and logics of affairs and conception.

Saudi Arabia and the New Power System in the Persian Gulf

Saudi Arabia and the New Power System in the Persian Gulf

Volume 7, Issue 25, Autumn 2004, Pages 551-573

Shahrouz Ebrahimi

Abstract The events of September 11 and the subsequent US occupation of Iraq changed the power system in the Persian Gulf that provided for the alliance of six Persian Gulf Cooperation Council’s countries along with the United States versus Iran and Iraq as two countries singled out of the system. This made the region enter a new stage of power interactions. On this basis, the Persian Gulf region is currently in a state of transition and the new power system has not been fully formed and established yet. Under the new circumstances, this article seeks to answer the question that what comprises the parameters of the new power system in the Persian Gulf. Also, what will be the place of Saudi Arabia as the most prominent GCC member in the system? To reply to the question, the author is of the belief that the place of Saudi Arabia and its significance in the US regional strategy will decline from the superior status and will be replaced by the small regional countries along with the new Iraq, due to the extended domestic dissatisfaction in Saudi Arabia with US extensive military presence, the rise of Islamic fundamentalism and the formation of alternative actors like Iraq and the United Arab Emirates. Therefore, the most likely situation in the region in the future will involve the establishment of a system based on the alliance of the small Persian Gulf countries along with Iraq, Saudi Arabia and the United States vis-à-vis the Islamic Republic of Iran as the only actor outside the alliance.