Introduction
In recent years, the intensification of great-power competition—most notably between the United States and China—has increased ambiguity and uncertainty within the international system. This development has heightened both the incentive and the necessity for middle powers to reassess their foreign policy strategies. One of the most prominent approaches in contemporary international relations scholarship is “hedging,” which is commonly conceptualized as a strategy aimed at reducing the risks of unilateral dependence while expanding strategic flexibility in the context of major power rivalry.
Hedging operates through a combination of practical mechanisms, including the maintenance of strategic ambiguity, diversification of external partnerships, leveraging national advantages, and the adoption of deliberately selective or even contradictory policy behaviors. Through these means, the strategy seeks to minimize the economic and security costs associated with full alignment with a single great power and to enhance room for maneuver in foreign policy. For a middle power such as Iran—whose external environment is deeply shaped by U.S.–China competition—hedging carries both analytical and practical relevance. Nevertheless, the practical implementation of this strategy encounters significant challenges, which constitute the central focus of this study.
Methodology
This research adopts a qualitative–analytical approach and employs a multi-level analysis framework. This method enables the simultaneous examination of factors operating at different levels and prevents the inappropriate generalization of findings from one level of analysis (such as the individual level) to another (such as the structural level). Accordingly, the study proceeds across three analytical levels:

Operational level: First, the operational components of hedging are identified; subsequently, the feasibility of implementing these components within the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran, as well as the associated operational challenges, is assessed.
Structural level: At this level, the study examines whether the structure of great-power competition in the international system—specifically U.S.–China rivalry—provides sufficient space for Iran to pursue a hedging strategy. The structural constraints on hedging are therefore critically evaluated.
Functional level: This level assesses the desirability and effectiveness of hedging as a foreign policy strategy for Iran.

Findings and Discussion
At the operational level, effective hedging requires the adoption of a deliberately ambiguous foreign policy posture. However, such ambiguity is fundamentally at odds with the established identity of the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran, as well as with the geopolitical realities of the West Asia region.
At the structural level, the United States has effectively pursued a strategy of denial toward Iran by imposing multilayered sanctions and targeting the country’s economic and security foundations. This approach has rendered Iran’s efforts at balanced engagement with the West largely ineffective, let alone allowing room for incorporating the United States into Iran’s security calculus. Moreover, available evidence suggests that U.S. policy toward Iran is, at certain levels, intertwined with Washington’s broader strategy to contain China. In this context, pressure on Iran is treated as an integral component of the U.S. approach to China containment. Moreover, the U.S.’s punitive approach toward Iran’s strategic ties with China and Russia has further constrained the space needed for effective hedging.
At the functional level, the findings indicate that, under current conditions, hedging does not necessarily lead to a reduction in Iran’s economic and security risks. In the absence of essential operational and structural preconditions, the adoption of a hedging strategy may instead increase uncertainty, perpetuate external pressures, and weaken Iran’s ability to effectively exploit international opportunities.
Conclusion
This study demonstrates that the implementation of hedging in the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran faces substantial operational, structural, and functional challenges. More specifically, the findings reveal a significant gap between the theoretical promises of hedging and its practical outcomes in the Iranian case. Nevertheless, the study argues against a wholesale rejection of hedging as a strategic option for Iran. Instead, it suggests the adoption of modified and issue-specific forms of hedging, such as hedging within the context of China–Russia competition, playing an active role as a hedging option among regional countries, or pursuing selective ambiguity toward extra-regional crises. These approaches should be complemented by domestic reinforcing measures—including sanctions mitigation through governance reform and the enhancement of economic capacity—in order to create the necessary preconditions for a more effective implementation of hedging in the future.