Introduction
Today, social media platforms have become a primary source of news and information for many, rivaling traditional television and satellite channels. In this landscape, coordinated rumors, fake news, deepfakes, and AI-generated content have emerged as powerful tools for undermining the legitimacy of individuals, institutions, and entire political systems. These developments point toward a growing phenomenon known as “computational propaganda”.
Computational propaganda refers to the use of algorithms, automation, and human oversight to manage social media ecosystems or to deliberately spread misleading content across these platforms.
In this context, the rise of computational propaganda presents serious challenges to the soft power of the Islamic Republic of Iran. While some government-affiliated groups have used these tools to defend and promote their image, misuse of such tactics has undermined the credibility of the political system. Meanwhile, domestic and foreign actors alike have increasingly exploited these techniques to weaken Iran’s influence by targeting its internal digital vulnerabilities.
Given the complexity and evolving nature of computational propaganda, it is essential to reassess how Iran can effectively protect its soft power in a competitive and often hostile information environment.
 
Methodology
This study adopts a mixed-methods approach, combining thematic analysis (qualitative) and social network analysis (quantitative).
The research begins by analyzing tweets related to the "Operation True Promise 2", using social network analysis to identify posts influenced or supported by Israeli propaganda. A selection of these tweets is then subjected to thematic analysis to determine which propaganda strategies, as outlined in the theoretical framework, were most commonly used against Iran.
First, tweets containing the hashtags or keywords "Iran", "Israel", "True Promise", and "missile" were collected using data-mining tools. A retweet network graph for the relevant tweets was then created and analyzed using the Force Atlas 2 algorithm. The Gephi software was also used for visualizing and analyzing the graph.
For the thematic analysis, axial coding was applied, based on five key computational propaganda strategies. Each strategy was operationally defined in relation to the Iranian context:
1- Supportive Content: Posts showing support for Israel, advocating war against Iran, or promoting Reza Pahlavi as a viable opposition figure aligned with Israeli interests.
2- Attacks and Exposés: Criticism of the Iranian leadership, the "Operation True Promise 2," and Iran's regional policies, as well as mockery of Iran’s missile capabilities and accusations about intentionally keeping airspace open.
3- Distraction: Attempts to divert public attention away from the "Operation True Promise 2".
4- Polarization and Division: Content aimed at creating rifts between the government and the people of Iran.
5- Harassment and Suppression: Personal attacks or online harassment targeting supporters of Palestine or the "Operation True Promise 2", often through ridicule or mockery.
 
Discussion and Results
The data indicate a clear level of coordination among monarchist users and pro-Israel accounts. This is evidenced by analyzing retweet patterns. On average, there was 1 retweet per 11.55 likes across all users. However, among regular users—who tend to be apolitical—this ratio was 1 retweet per 51.31 likes, suggesting little to no coordination. In contrast, among monarchist users, the ratio was 1 retweet per 9.31 likes, implying higher levels of coordination and deliberate message amplification.
Among the tweets analyzed, humorous content received the most likes. This was followed by posts criticizing the Iranian political system, Supreme Leader, the "Operation True Promise 2", and Iran’s regional policies—especially those mocking the country's missile capabilities. Tweets in support of the government, the resistance axis, or opposing war received the next highest levels of engagement.
 
Conclusion
The findings clearly show that Israeli information operations have been actively used to damage Iran’s credibility and redirect public opinion toward alternative figures. Among the five identified strategies, “attacks and exposés” were the most prevalent. Simultaneously, efforts were made to frame Israel as a hero and Reza Pahlavi as a political alternative.
This study highlights how emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence and social media have opened new avenues for political systems to influence rivals and boost their own power. Computational propaganda, in particular, has become a powerful tool that can directly threaten the political integrity of other nations—and one that even weaker states can deploy against more powerful ones.
Addressing this challenge requires new strategies and a fundamentally different approach to governance, including changes in media, social, cultural, and political policies. Such strategies should aim to enhance the credibility of domestic media, build public trust in political leadership, and reduce societal and political tensions.