Introduction
Discussions of security have evolved along two main paths in the United States and Europe.
American scholars have generally adopted a problem-solving approach, developing theories within the frameworks of offensive and defensive realism, constructivism, and debates over the relative roles of power and institutions in maintaining order.
In contrast, Europeans—drawing on critical theory and emancipatory thought—have explored security through the lenses of critical security studies, feminism, the Copenhagen School, the Paris School, and post-structuralism.
In short, one tradition seeks to achieve security and prevent conflict within the existing international framework, while the other views that very framework as a source of insecurity and instability.
Since the 1980s, the growing influence of constructivist interpretations has helped bridge this divide. In this view, security is seen as distinct from both peace and power, and is understood as a relational concept that evolves through social interaction. Anarchy is conceived as a spectrum that must pass through its stages—from infancy to maturity and old age. Security, likewise, is understood as a relational discourse situated between the discourse of pure power and that of authentic social engagement.
Building on this theoretical foundation, this study examines the security structure of West Asia, which is marked by exclusivity, volatility, institutional fragility, and a tendency toward violence. It argues that the region remains trapped in a state of immature anarchy, where competition, mistrust and security dilemmas dominate and structural underdevelopment prevents the establishment of lasting peace.
This analysis is guided by two main questions:

What factors explain the persistence of this immature security structure?
How might it evolve toward a more mature and stable order?

The study adopts the view that security structures are not purely material or power-based but are also social constructs—shaped by shared knowledge, norms, and interactions. Accordingly, the regional order in West Asia results from both the distribution of power and patterns of social relations among its main actors.
 
Methodology
Questions such as “What is security?”, “How can it be achieved?”, and “At what level should it be constructed?” have produced a wide range of theoretical answers—from realism to critical theory. Similarly, debates over whether competition or cooperation dominates the international system—and over what constitutes the security referent object, security agent, and security model—have given rise to competing paradigms.
This study adopts a hybrid and integrative approach that seeks to bridge these divides. For this, it introduces a new conceptual framework—the Critical Non-Democratic Peace Model—based on the idea that the international system has shifted from a distributive to a multiplicative structure. In such a system, traditional theoretical frameworks are no longer sufficient to explain evolving dynamics. Therefore, we must either develop new theoretical perspectives or combine existing ones to capture this complexity.
To this end, the paper integrates insights from four major traditions:

Democratic Peace Theory
Holistic Constructivism
Critical Theory
Structural Realism

A mixed-method approach, combining qualitative and quantitative methods and relying on both library and online resources, is used to support the analysis.
 
Findings and Discussion
A central question in security studies has long been how peace emerges and under what conditions it can be sustained. In the context of West Asia, this question becomes even more pressing: Why has peace remained elusive in this region? Are the sources of instability internal, structural, or both? Does the absence of democratic governance explain the recurring conflicts—or is democracy itself irrelevant to regional security?
Drawing on the Critical Non-Democratic Peace Theory, this study argues that the key obstacle to stability in West Asia is the absence of a shared understanding of balance among the region’s main powers. Sustainable peace, therefore, does not depend primarily on a state’s political system—democratic or otherwise—but rather on whether regional actors can reach a mutual conception of equilibrium in their relations.
 
Conclusion
This research challenges the assumptions of Democratic Peace Theory, which holds that peace is achievable only among democratic states. The findings show that the four major powers in West Asia—Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Israel—each operate according to different logics of balance:

Iran: Balance of identity
Turkey: Balance of interests
Israel: Balance of threat
Saudi Arabia: Balance of power

Because these actors lack a common understanding of balance, their interactions are marked by persistent misperceptions, mistrust, and conflict.
The study further distinguishes between different types of peace:

A balance of power produces a fragile, fear-based peace.
A balance of interests leads to a more stable, institutionalized peace built on mutual benefits and interests.
A balance of threat or identity generates a normatively grounded peace—though the former is civic and democratic, while the latter tends to be ideological or sectarian.

Ultimately, the paper concludes that peace is not exclusive to democratic systems. Even non-democratic regions such as West Asia can achieve peace—provided that their leading states develop a shared sense of balance, regardless of the specific form that balance takes.