Introduction
Historically, intelligence has consistently been under political scrutiny, with intelligence elites often perceived as political servants. Intelligence, leveraging its ability to operate covertly, strives to supply the necessary data for policymakers to make informed decisions. Essentially, the primary objective of intelligence is to aid users in decision-making processes regarding potential actions. Against this background, it becomes crucial that intelligence remains unbiased and is not swayed by the political inclinations of a country’s political factions and parties, internal and external organizational interests, or the personal interests of politicians.
Intelligence operations should be conducted independently of political goals, and only the results derived should be presented to politicians. Fundamentally, intelligence agencies should prioritize national interests and remain detached from political, group, and personal interests. Thus, supporting policy-making differs from favoring a policy to the extent that objectivity is overlooked. The quintessence of the ideal relationship between intelligence and politics should be articulated as follows: Intelligence should serve the realm of politics, not its political overlords.
However, when the political environment influences intelligence to the point where intelligence outputs demonstrate a political leaning, we observe the phenomenon of intelligence politicization. Literature on intelligence indicates that politicization occurs when intelligence analysts, whether consciously or unconsciously, are swayed to generate outcomes that align with policymakers’ desires, rather than delivering the truth. This scenario represents a significant departure from the fundamental responsibility of intelligence, which is to tell the truth to those in authority.
 
Methodology
The politicization theory is formulated within the context of case studies. Essentially, it’s a research approach that involves the use of one or more case examples to construct theoretical frameworks, propositions, or mid-level theories, all of which are grounded in case-specific and empirical evidence. The key idea is that the employment of case examples forms the foundation for theory in an inductive way. In this approach, the theory evolves by identifying patterns of relationships both between and within the structures of case examples and their inherent logical arguments. This type of theory is rooted in the theorizing methodology of Paul R. Carlile and Clayton M. Christensen, following the pyramid of theorizing. Here, the politicization within intelligence agencies (both domestic and international) is examined through methods such as observation, interviews, and the study of secondary documents (library research). Following the theoretical framework of Carlile and Christensen, multiple cases were initially investigated. Subsequently, the observed elements were categorized. The relationships among the identified elements were then discerned. Ultimately, the primary propositions were established.
 
Result and Discussion
The theory of intelligence politicization encompasses two primary dimensions as detailed below:

Behavioral Dimension of Politicization

This refers to the elements that form the foundation of politicization within an intelligence organization. In the absence of these elements, politicization would not manifest. However, since some of them are inherent to the nature and essence of the intelligence organization, they internalize and institutionalize politicization. This dimension of politicization is deemed a necessary, but not sufficient precondition for the emergence of politicization in intelligence organizations. The behavioral dimension is subdivided into three categories: intelligence officer behavior, organizational behavior, and environmental behavior.
The behavior of the intelligence officer is influenced by a collection of factors that shape their individual actions. Organizational behavior is determined by factors that originate from the organization and its structure. Environmental behavior encompasses all factors that exist outside the intelligence organization, essentially residing in its external environment.

The Process Dimension of Politicization

This dimension refers to the actions and processes that give rise to politicization. By actualizing politicization, they induce alterations in the structure of politicization. This represents one of the sufficient, but not necessary, preconditions for the occurrence of politicization within intelligence organizations.
The process dimension of politicization is divided into three categories: “high process factors”, “low process factors”, and “online process factors”. The first encompasses all elements that are influenced by the policymaker to instigate politicization within the intelligence organization. The second refers to those elements that are executed by intelligence officers (except senior intelligence directors) to induce politicization. Given that in governmental bureaucracies, the appointment of directors is a critical phase in policy making and its execution, the emergence of politicization by intelligence directors is categorized separately under the third label of “online process factors”.