Introduction
Economic corruption is widely recognized as one of the major obstacles to sustainable development. In addition to reducing the efficiency of economic systems, it undermines public trust in institutions and governance. While a substantial body of research has examined corruption within governmental organizations, the rapid growth of quasi-governmental commercial enterprises calls for a renewed approach to understanding corruption in these entities.
Situated in an ambiguous position between the public and private sectors, quasi-governmental companies often benefit from the advantages of both. On the one hand, they enjoy access to public resources and state-backed privileges; on the other hand, their nominally private status allows them to avoid the stringent oversight typically imposed on public institutions. As a result of incomplete privatization processes, these organizations frequently exhibit neither the efficiency associated with the private sector nor the transparency and accountability expected of public institutions. This dual character creates fertile ground for various forms of economic misconduct.
Given the substantial financial resources controlled by these companies, corruption within them can lead to serious consequences, including disruptions in production processes, capital outflows, violations of minority shareholders' rights, and damage to the public interest. Therefore, effective corruption prevention requires a thorough understanding of the organizational conditions and mechanisms that facilitate corrupt behavior.
A review of the existing literature indicates that most studies have focused on macro-level determinants and structural dimensions of corruption, while relatively little attention has been paid to the internal organizational mechanisms and corruption-generating factors within quasi-governmental enterprises. Accordingly, the central question of this study is: What organizational conditions within quasi-governmental commercial companies create opportunities for economic corruption?
To address this question, the study employs a qualitative research design based on thematic analysis. Following a review of the relevant concepts and literature, the methodological framework is outlined, and the findings are presented and interpreted through a thematic matrix. The analysis focuses on identifying a set of intra-organizational opportunities that facilitate the misappropriation of corporate assets in quasi-governmental companies.
Methodology
This study adopts an interpretive qualitative approach aimed at uncovering hidden patterns of corruption. The research participants consisted of senior and middle-level managers with at least five years of managerial experience and postgraduate qualifications. Participants were selected through a two-stage sampling process involving purposive and snowball sampling until theoretical saturation was reached.
To collect data and enhance the credibility of the findings, eight in-depth semi-structured interviews were conducted. In parallel, twenty key organizational cases—including legal documents and audit reports—were examined over a six-month period.
The collected data were analyzed inductively using Braun and Clarke's six-phase thematic analysis framework with the aid of MAXQDA software. The resulting themes were subsequently organized into a thematic matrix. Throughout the research process, ethical considerations, including the confidentiality of documents and participants' identities, were strictly observed.
Findings and Discussion
The integration of the extracted themes with the theoretical framework reveals a three-dimensional structure that fosters corruption within quasi-governmental companies. The findings suggest that corruption emerges through the interaction of three interconnected factors:
1. Weak Corporate Governance: The Structural Foundation of Corruption
Weak corporate governance constitutes the primary foundation in which corruption develops. It creates opportunities for misconduct through three main mechanisms. First, deficiencies in organizational design, manifested in the prevalence of “golden signatures”, unquestioning employee compliance with superiors, the absence of effective oversight, and the frequent replacement or inexperience of managers. Second, the emergence of conflicts of interest, particularly through privileged access to information and the redirection of corporate resources toward personal gain. Third, ineffective human resource management, which contributes to information leakage and encourages former employees to engage in harmful competition with the company.
2. Destructive Organizational Culture: The Cognitive Facilitator
A dysfunctional organizational culture reduces the psychological barriers to misconduct by providing moral justifications for unethical behavior. This culture is characterized by the legitimization of informal networks through collusion, factionalism, and inadequate legal awareness. It is further reinforced by perceptions of organizational injustice arising from the absence of merit-based practices and inequitable compensation systems, both of which increase employees' propensity toward deviant behavior.
3. Defective Oversight: The Mechanism Sustaining Corruption
The findings indicate that oversight mechanisms are not necessarily absent; rather, they often fail to perform their deterrent function effectively. This failure stems from weaknesses in information systems, including reliance on outdated procedures, deficiencies in reporting and information management, and delayed detection of corrupt practices. Additional factors include inconsistent and discretionary supervision resulting from the lack of clear monitoring standards, the formalistic operation of internal control mechanisms such as boards of directors and supervisory committees, and excessive reliance on individual actors in oversight processes. Together, these shortcomings create a protective environment that enables misconduct to persist.
Conclusion
In contrast to previous studies that have primarily emphasized macro-level and political-economic explanations of corruption, this study demonstrates that the internal organizational structure of quasi-governmental companies plays a crucial role in the emergence of economic corruption.
The findings show that corruption arises from the interaction of three key factors: weak corporate governance, which creates opportunities for illicit gain; a destructive organizational culture, which provides motivation and moral justification for misconduct; and defective oversight, which emerged as the most prominent finding of the study. Although the oversight mechanism appears formally legitimate, its procedural nature and the breakdown of information systems significantly undermine its effectiveness and create a safe environment for corrupt actors.
The findings suggest that effective anti-corruption policies should move beyond purely punitive approaches and focus on organizational reform. Such reforms should include measures to address administrative injustices, particularly inequities in compensation and promotion systems, as well as the implementation of real-time, data-driven monitoring mechanisms. Furthermore, future research should examine industry-specific corruption mechanisms in order to develop more targeted and effective prevention strategies for the quasi-governmental sector.